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Cooperating Clients
DANIEL C. RICHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Indicted on serious narcotics charges, Jose Lopez retained Barry Tarlow to
"vigorously defend and try the case."' Tarlow was up to the task but warned
Lopez that it was "his general policy not to represent clients in negotiations
with the government concerning cooperation," and that he did not plan to make
any exception for Lopez.2 As Tarlow later explained, he found such
negotiations "personally[,] morally and ethically offensive." 3 This arrangement
suited Lopez just fine, until he wavered in his resolution. Encouraged by a co-
defendant, worried about his children, and hoping to obtain an early release
from prison in order to be with them, Lopez asked his co-defendant's lawyer to
initiate discussions with the government. He told his own lawyer nothing about
this overture, calculating that Tarlow would serve him well if negotiations
broke down and the case ended up going to trial. Sensitive to the constitutional
and ethical issues raised by a defendant's efforts to go behind his lawyer's back
but relying on a memorandum from Attorney General Thornburgh authorizing
pre-indictment contacts with represented defendants, 4 the prosecutor had Lopez
* Associate Professor, Fordlam University School of Law; A.B., Harvard College,
1980; J.D., Yale Law School, 1984. 1 would like to thank Marc Arkin, Alexandra Bowie,
Dan Capra, Michael Chertoff, Jill Fisch, Jim Fleming, Bruce Green, Larry Kramer, Pam
Karlan, Debra Livingston, Jerry Lynch, Russell Pearce, Pete Putzel, Picky Revesz, Carol
Steiker, Bill Stuntz, Steve Thel, and loyd Weinreb for their generous and valuable
comments. I am also grateful to Laura Goldman for her research assistance, and to
Fordham University School of Law for its grant in support of this project.
From 1987 until 1992, I was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of New York. Although I hope that the insights I gained during this period are not
colored by the biases of advocacy, I'm sure they are and therefore make this disclosure.
1 United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting an
affidavit submitted by Barry Tarlow, Esq.), rev'd, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the factual recitation here draws upon
the facts and allegations in Lopez, certain additional facts have been omitted in the interest
of clarity.
2 Id. at 1438-39.
3 Id. at 1440 n.12 (quoting Tarlow affidavit). Among the clients that Tarlow has said
he "will not represent out of moral repugnance" are "snitches, Nazis and an Argentine
general said to be responsible for 10,000 'disappearances.'" Gail D. Cox, Fighting and
Flaunting It, 15 NAT'L L.., Apr. 19, 1993, at 28.
4 Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1445 nn.20-21. See UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DEP'T. OF JUSTIC MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 2, 9-2.010A. The "Thornburgh Memorandum" was
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brought before a magistrate, who advised Lopez of the dangers of proceeding
without the assistance of counsel. Undeterred, Lopez signed a written waiver
avowing his belief that Tarlow did not represent his best interests in the matter.
He then met with the prosecutor and revealed the names of several alleged drug
traffickers.
Upon learning of Lopez's meetings with the prosecutor, Tarlow withdrew
from the case. Not long thereafter, Lopez, now with new counsel and evidently
dissatisfied with the progress of his plea negotiations, moved to dismiss the
indictment, alleging that the government had violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and DR 7-104(A)(1) of the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which bars an attorney from
communicating with a represented party without the knowledge and consent of
opposing counsel.5 The district court found no Sixth Amendment violation, 6
but it concluded that the "prosecutor's actions constituted an intentional
violation of the long-standing ethical prohibition" expressed in DR 7-1047 and
that dismissal of the indictment was the appropriate sanction for the
government's "flagrant and egregious misconduct." 8 Although the Ninth
Circuit later vacated the district court's order, it found fault only with that
court's choice of remedy and agreed with the court's condemnation of the
prosecutor's decision to deal with Lopez behind the back, and without the
essentially reiterated in regulations published in the Federal Register, Communications with
Represented Persons, 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737 (1992) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77)
(proposed Nov. 20, 1992), but on January 22, 1993, these regulations were withdrawn,
pending a review by the Clinton Administration. Jusice Department Withdraws Regulation,
52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1385 (Feb. 3, 1993). They were thereafter reproposed by
Attorney General Reno on March 3, 1994. Communications with Represented Persons, 59
Fed. Reg. 10,086 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994).
5 Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1444. DR 7-104(A)(1) states:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1)
Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with
a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do
so ....
MODEL CoDE oF PROFSSIONAL REspoNsmiLrry DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983). The California
Rules of Professional Conduct incorporate this rule as Rule 2-100. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at
1450. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain a
similar provision, Rule 4.2. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 4.2 (1994).
6 Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1456 & n.43.
7 Id. at 1460.
8 Id. at 1461, 1463.
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knowledge, of his lawyer. 9
Lopez has added new fire to the already heated debate about the extent to
which the conduct of prosecutors can or should be regulated through generally
applicable ethics rules, and more particularly, the extent to which DR 7-
104(A)(1) should be read to bar prosecutors from communicating with
represented defendants.10 But the case also highlights a very different issue-
one that has received all too little attention. How well does our adversarial
system serve defendants like Lopez who, having been arrested and formally
charged, have the option of "cooperating" with the government against other
defendants? Put differently, what danger is there that the choices of defendants
like Lopez will be skewed by the personal interests or ideologies of their
defense lawyers?
The starting point for any such inquiry must be cooperation itself. Part I
addresses its benefits and liabilities. A simple plea of guilty rarely carries any
stigma or risk, beyond that flowing from the conviction itself.11 Indeed, most
9 United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d
1455 (9th Cir. 1993).10 See COMMITTEE ON CRMNAL LAW, Regulating the Conduct of United States
Department of Justice Employees Who Communicate with Persons Represented by Counsel,
45 RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YoRK 834 (1990); Bruce A.
Green, A Prosecutor's Communications with Defendants: What Are the Liits, 24 CraM. L.
BULL. 283 (1988); Peter 3. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting
White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 405, 471-75 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal
Representation: The Oanging Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARv. L. REv. 670,
700-03 (1992); Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and
Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PIT. L. REv. 515
(1992); F. Dennis Saylor, IV & I. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole:
The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 459 (1992);
William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv. 1903
(1993); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137,
1176-83 (1987); Marc A. Schwartz, Note, Prosecutorial Investigations and DR 7-104(A),
89 COLUM. L. REv. 940 (1989).
11 Although entry of a guilty plea conditioned on receipt of a sentencing discount is
hardly an indication of true atonement, those who do plead guilty are often said to have
"accepted responsibility" for their actions. U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] ("Entry
of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthful admission of
involvement in the offense and related conduct will constitute significant evidence of
acceptance of responsibility for purposes of this section.").
Even Mafiosi do not look askance at those who simply plead guilty. See United States
v. Gotti, No. CR 90-1051 (E.D.N.Y.), Tr. 4303 (Mar. 4, 1992) (testimony of Salvatore
1995]
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defendants take this course, usually in exchange for a sentencing discount.12
"Snitching" 13 is a very different matter, and those who do it often face
economic or physical retaliation and social ostracism. But with these
disincentives come extraordinary opportunities, because the snitch can expect a
far more lenient sentence than he would have received had he merely pleaded
guilty.14
The decision faced by one with information to trade is far more complex
than that faced by the defendant with the stark choice of pleading guilty or
going to trial. Why this is so can best be explained by the analogy to
commercial contract theory developed in Part I. The defendant deciding
whether to plead guilty contemplates entry into a traditional executory
agreement. 15 The prosecutor will offer a sentencing discount-or, more often,
the promise to recommend such a discount to the sentencing judge-to induce a
guilty plea.' 6 With rare exceptions, "future contingencies are not only known
Gravano) (members of Mafia family free to plead guilty to criminal charges, so long as they
did not admit membership in or existence of "La Cosa Nostra"). This is also true for those
in political movements. See Kathy Boudin et al., The Bust Book, in RADICAL LAWYEm:
THm ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 99, 100-01 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971)
("[iUsually it will be of far greater political value for you to cop a plea and be immediately
free to organize, than for you to be politically honest in the courtroom where you will have
no influence.").
12 During the year ending June 30, 1990, of the 46,725 defendants convicted and
sentenced in United States district courts, 39,734 (85%) had entered guilty pleas, and 718
(1.5%), pleas of nolo contendere. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRMIN AL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 530 tbl. 5.37 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991).
The proportion of guilty pleas in state cases may be even greater. In 300 representative
counties, 91% of the felony convictions in 1988 came from guilty pleas. Id. at 545 tbl.
5.48.
13 See Craig M. Carver, Word Histories: "Snitch", ATLANTICMONTHLY, Jan. 1994, at
128 ("Sitch... was originally seventeenth-century cant for 'a fillip on the nose,'" and,
like "nose" itself, came to mean "to inform on.").
14 A defendant deemed by the prosecution to have valuable information and minimal
culpability may escape having to plead to any charges. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for
Cooperation in Oin'nal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992). Because such
nonprosecution arrangements are simply an extreme variant of the sentencing concessions in
plea agreements, I do not address them separately.
15 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ.
1909, 1921 (1992) ("Typically, a plea bargain involves a simple promissory exchange: the
defendant trades his promise to plead guilty (and waives his right to trial) for the
prosecutor's promise to recommend a specific sentence.").
16 Because in most jurisdictions the sentencing judge is generally not bound to accept
the prosecutor's recommendation, "[the typical plea bargain is in fact an agreement by both
sides to present the case to the sentencing judge in a particular way-from the defendant's
[Vol. 56:69
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and understood at the time the bargain is struck, but can also be addressed by
efficacious contractual responses." 17 Any breach by the government I8 will
likely be clear at sentencing, and the consequence (at least in theory) will either
be specific performance or a return to square one, with the defendant getting
his plea back.19 In contrast, a cooperation agreement is usually a leap into the
unknown, resembling more a "relational contract" than an executory
agreement.20 The defendant's obligations under the agreement will be defined
vaguely: He must cooperate and testify fully and truthfully. He can expect
some sentencing break in exchange for his cooperation, but the extent of that
break will often be unknown until sentencing, which typically will not occur
until after he has rendered his assistance to the government. Because the
sentencing judge will likely defer to the government when deciding whether the
defendant has kept his part of the bargain, the defendant who cooperated in
good faith may find himself robbed of his valuable information and branded as
a snitch, with nothing to show for his pains but a long prison sentence.
To recognize the one-sidedness of enforcement mechanisms in cooperation
agreements is to appreciate the critical role of defense lawyers in the decision to
cooperate. A zealous defense attorney cannot give the defendant contemplating
side, an agreement to plead guilty to specified offenses; from the government's side, a
promise to say (or to avoid saying) particular things at sentencing." Id. at 1954.
17 Charles 1. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1090 (1981). This is not to say that there are no issues as to the fairness of such
executory agreements. Compare Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15 ith Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.L 1979 (1992) and Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargain Debate, 69 CAL. L. Rnv. 652 (1981).
18 The term "government" is meant to refer to the prosecution in a general sense,
because the issues raised in this Article arise in both state and federal prosecutions. I do
admit, though, that the cases and studies on which I rely, and my own personal experience,
have given this Article a decidedly federal focus.
19 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Peter Westen & David Westin,
A Constitutional Law of Remediesfor Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1978).
20 Ian R. McNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 691, 694
(1974); see also Ian R. McNeil, Relational Contract. What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 483. Goetz and Scott explain:
In a complex society... many contractual arrangements diverge so markedly from the
classical model that they require separate treatment. Parties frequently enter into
continuing, highly interactive contractual arrangements. For these parties, a complete
contingent contract may not be a feasible contracting mechanism. Where the future
contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncertain, practical difficulties arise that impede
the contracting parties' efforts to allocato optimally all risks at the time of contracting.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 1090.
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cooperation the certainty of a simple plea bargain, but she can vastly reduce the
risk. Her legal knowledge and experience will help the defendant assess the
likely outcome of a trial, the value of his information, the nature of both
parties' obligations under a cooperation agreement, the likelihood and extent of
a sentencing discount, and other such factors. Even more importantly, as a
repeat player in the market where the government buys information,2 1 the
defense lawyer helps guarantee that the government will meet its obligations in
good faith.22
In Part I, we move from theory to practice, and inquire into the
likelihood that a defense attorney will perform her role properly, and give her
client the fair assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation
that will allow him to make an informed decision at this critical juncture. She
certainly is under an ethical obligation to do so23 and ordinarily will be
presumed to have lived up to this duty.24 The issue, however, is whether this
confidence is justified by reality or simply by necessity.
2 1 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for
-Unfair- Plea Bargains, 23 RAND J. ECON. 507, 508 (1992) (addressing "plea bargaining
system's role as a device through which a prosecutor 'buys information").
22 William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761,
832-33 (1989) ("Many defense lawyers are repeat players with whom the government must
deal often. If prosecutors renege on their bargains, counsel will learn not to trust them, and
future bargains simply will not be made."). This is not to say that defense lawyers' status as
repeat players plays no role in policing the government's conduct in ordinary plea bargains
as well. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1923. As will be shown in this Article,
however, the need for such guarantors is far greater where a defendant cooperates with the
government.
23 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1983) ("A lawyer should
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."); id. Canon 7 ("A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); id. DR 7-101 (lawyer to
seek the lawful objectives of his client through "reasonably available means"); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.4(b) (1994) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation."); id. Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests .... "); see STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1 (1979) ("After
informing... herself fully on the facts and the law, the lawyer should advise the accused
with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the
probable outcome.... It is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer intentionally to understate
or overstate the risks, hazards, or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the
accused's decision as to his... plea.").
24 See Fiumara v. United States, 727 F.2d 209, 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
951 (1984).
[Vol. 56:69
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One aspect of the problem has received considerable attention. Many have
documented how indigent defendants with appointed counsel, or defendants of
limited means, are all too frequently coaxed, cajoled, or coerced into pleading
guilty by attorneys who place wealth maximization-or effort minimization,
which is just another aspect of wealth maximization-over professional duty.25
An attorney of this ilk, pushing her client to plead guilty, might well press him
to cooperate as well-if cooperation is an option26-because the lower
sentences that cooperating usually brings will doubtless make the prospect of a
guilty plea more palatable to the defendant. Advice biased toward cooperation
may also come, to a far lesser extent, from defense attorneys who seek to aid
the government either out of a misplaced sense of public spirit or for personal
gain-perhaps so that they can market themselves as "deal makers." There is
no evidence that this is a particularly large group, but its existence has been
vociferously noted by some of the more adversarial members of the defense
bar.27
The prevailing picture of a defense bar systemically biased toward plea
bargaining and, by extension, cooperation is not complete. There are also
pressures on attorneys to avoid cooperation. The risk that a defense lawyer
with ties to an identified third party will deter her client from rendering
25 See, e.g., RoBERT HERMAN ET AL., COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 158 (1977) (After
studying indigent representation in three cities, "[it became clear that the criminal defense
bar includes in its ranks far too many lawyers who know little law, who are indifferent to or
even contemptuous of their clients' circumstances, who do not work thoroughly and
diligently to prepare the best defense, who are temperamentally incapable of giving
vigorous adversarial representation when that is warranted, and whose style of practice is
dictated largely by economic or institutional considerations that are inconsistent with high-
quality representation."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179 (1975); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Cothes, 13 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 672 (1986) (plea bargaining as "mechanism for
relieving the defender of the need to prepare that case"); Schulhofer, supra note 17, at
1988-90; Poor Man's Jsti ce, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45-87. A defender's aversion
to trying cases may be based as much on fear of personal embarrassment as on economic
sel-interest.
26 Cooperation might not be an option for a large number of indigent defendants. The
lone defendant charged with a street crime might have no accomplices to cooperate against
and insufficient knowledge about unrelated criminal activity to make him of interest to the
government.
27 See ALAN M. DmRsHOwrrz, THE BEsT DEFENSE 400-02 (Vintage Books 1983)
(describing "prosecutor[s] in defense attorney's clothing" whose "hearts are not in
defending criminals" and "who hope, someday, to return to the prosecutorial establishment
in senior positions."); Barry Tarlow, Life After Caplin & Drysale, 14 THE CHAMPION,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 40.
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cooperation harmful to that third party is well known.28 Yet little thought has
been given to the ideological and economic considerations, cutting across cases,
that may similarly lead defense lawyers to dissuade or deter clients from
cooperating, regardless of the clients' best interests. I would like to begin to fill
this gap in this Article.
The irony of this bias against cooperation is that its roots may lie in the
very motivations that can lead defense lawyers to render the highest quality,
most zealous representation to their clients. A personal commitment to
checking the government's law enforcement powers or a concern for
professional reputation in the market for legal services might easily conquer
any reasons a lawyer might have for doing less than her best for a client. This
is the stuff of which vigorous advocates are made. These motivations,
however, may skew a lawyer's advice on the issue of cooperation. The
vigorous battler against the overweening government in one case might well
refuse to countenance the prospect of her next client helping that same
government prosecute another defendant. And the lawyer seeking to attract
future clients may find herself cut out of a significant segment of the market if
she becomes known as someone who will cooperate her clients. The point here
is not that cooperation is necessarily in a defendant's best interest; this certainly
is not true. Nor is it that zealous defense attorneys will invariably seek to
discourage cooperation. I merely argue that there are considerable pressures on
a broad range of attorneys to deter their clients from cooperating and that there
is reason to believe that these pressures affect the advice that many defendants
receive.
If this is a problem, is there a solution to it? Part IV canvasses the ways in
which defendants whose attorneys would deter them from cooperation might be
given fairer advice about that option. But its conclusion is far from satisfying.
Courts cannot provide, or even guarantee, such counseling. And even though
the incentives of private defense lawyers as repeat players in the market for
legal services can pose a threat to their impartiality, the monitoring role they
play as repeat players in criminal litigation argues strongly against allowing the
government to circumvent them to deal directly with potential cooperators. 29 In
the end, this is a piece about the adversary system, its virtues, and its
limitations. A vigorous defense bar has properly been hailed as the best
protection for individual defendants, and society as a whole, against the power
of the state. But the sources of this vigor have their own pitfalls. And at a time
when a defendant is most in need of disinterested and informative legal advice,
he may not get it.
28 See infra note 183.
29 This general rule must give way where a defendant has reason to avoid alerting his
lawyer to his interest in cooperating. See infra text accompanying notes 265-72.
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I. SNiTCHING: ITS RISKS AND ITS REWARDS
The defendant facing serious criminal charges3" who has first-hand
information about the wrongdoing of others is generally in a better position
than he would be without such a bargaining chip. Should he choose not to
cooperate with the government, he can either take the case to trial or avail
himself of the sentencing discount generally available to defendants who simply
plead guilty.31 Indeed, there may be irresistible pressures on him to remain
3 0 Because this Article focuses on the effect of the adversary system on the advice that
defendants are given about cooperation, I do not address cases in which a putative defendant
has the option of cooperating before formal charges have been brought against him.
Because such an individual may not have access to a lawyer at all, those cases raise very
different issues. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after formal charges have been
brought); see also George E. Dix, Promdses, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave's Bright Line
Rule Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207 (discussing voluntariness issues raised by station
house confessions where suspects told that cooperation would bring leniency); Robert L.
Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29
STAN. L. REV. 713, 714 (1977) (discussing police practice of "diverting arrestees as
informants by giving them the option of bypassing the criminal justice system in return for
their agreement to do undercover work for the police"); Jay Zitter, Annotation,
Enforceability of Agreement by Law Enforcement Officials Not to Prosecute if Accused
Would Help in Oiminal Investigation or Would Become Witness Against Others, 32 A.L.R.
4TH 990 (1984) (collecting and analyzing state and federal cases in which courts discussed
when various cooperative agreements are binding on the prosecution).
31 A qualification is needed here. In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980),
the Court held that a sentencing judge could properly consider a defendant's "refusal to
cooperate with officials investigating a criminal conspiracy in which he was a confessed
participant." Id. at 553; see United States v. Bell, 905 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("Roberts... clearly establishes the constitutional propriety of the statutorily recognized
practice of allowing a person's sentence to vary depending on whether he has
cooperated."); cf. Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1980)
(defending position later adopted in Roberts but arguing for procedural limitations).
Thereafter, some courts drew a distinction between "increasing the severity of a sentence
for a defendant's failure to cooperate and refusing to grant leniency," barring the former,
but permitting the latter. United States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1987); see
also United States v. Bradford, 645 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1981). Consistent with this
approach, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that "[a] defendant's refusal to assist
authorities in the investigation of other persons may not be considered as an aggravating
sentencing factor." U.S.S.G. § 5K1.2. The possibility remains, however, that a sentencing
judge's readiness to grant leniency on other grounds, or the positions taken by a prosecutor
in plea negotiations, will be influenced by knowledge that the defendant is withholding
valuable information. See United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that § 5K1.2 does not preclude consideration of defendant's refusal to cooperate
1995]
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silent about the affairs of his associates or acquaintances. Loyalty, or fear of
retaliation, may be his foremost consideration, and even the most unreflective
defendant will likely look beyond the direct consequences of his actions to
others and consider what it means to be a "snitch" in our society. 32 Yet partly
because of the common disdain for snitches (and partly in spite of it)
governments have long rewarded cooperators with special leniency. Such
rewards seem particularly great in these days of lengthy sentences, 33 and they
continue to give defendants extraordinary incentives to cooperate.
A. The Tug of Loyalty, the Fear of Retaliation, and the Shame of
Snitching
Because those who commit crimes would prefer that information about
their illegal activities not be in the hands of people over whom they exercise no
persuasion or control, the defendant with personal knowledge of the misdeeds
of someone else will generally-though not invariably-have obtained it by
virtue of having a relationship of trust with that person. Perhaps the defendant
himself participated in those crimes; perhaps he did not but was trusted with
the information by those who did. Either way, he can be expected to have some
loyalty to the "target" against whom he can cooperate.3 4 The loyalty can stem
from a group ethic of secrecy that the defendant has explicitly avowed, e.g.,
the Mafia oath.35 It can be the allegiance a corporate employee feels to his
when choosing what sentence he should receive within presumptive guidelines range.).
There obviously will be no penalty where the authorities are unaware that the defendant has
such information.
3 2 See GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY 8 (1993) ("Some of the strongest moral epithets
in the English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the threshold of loyalty:
They commit adultery, betrayal, treason."); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL
130 (1966) ("[1]n our culture, as is evidenced by the children's terms 'tattletale' and 'snitch'
as well as by the underworld's 'fink' and 'stoolie,' informants are objects of contempt and
derision.").
33 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 148 (1991) (federal statistics show
"significant increases both in the use of incarcerative sentences and in the average length of
prison sentences" between 1984 and 1990) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; see also infra
note 72.
34 Of course, the defendant who has obtained his information by being a victim or just
an innocent bystander is not likely to feel any loyalty to his putative targets.
35 See United States v. Gotti, No. CR 90-1051 (E.D.N.Y.), Tr. 3975-76 (Mar. 4,
1992) (testimony of Salvatore Gravano) (telling of secrecy oath taken upon initiation into
Mafia family); Francis A.J. Ianni, The Lupollo Famdly and Their Rules of Conduct, in 1 SIR
LEON RADzwowicz & MARviN E. WOLFGANG, CRIME & JUSTICE: THE CRIMNAL IN
SOCIETY 218, 252 (2d ed. 1977) (Organized crime family's rule of secrecy extends to "all
[Vol. 56:69
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company and supervisors.36 It can be a loyalty based on a blood relationship,
ethnic ties, or close friendship. 37 Or it can be the camaraderie of the loosely-
knit gang that "hangs out" together.38 In their many forms, such loyalties can
be powerful arguments against cooperation.
Considerations of loyalty can carry even more weight if a defendant fears
that his act of betrayal will be punished. For some, the threat of physical
retaliation by former associates is very real,39 and reprisals against a
cooperator's friends or family can be as much a possibility as they are against
those who actually cooperate.40 Other defendants can fear the loss of their
jobs41 or "the sanctions of the marketplace that often follow a person's
providing incriminating information against business associates." 42
Neither should one minimize the social cost of cooperating, the "aversion
and nauseous disdain" with which the snitch will be regarded, 43 not just by his
areas of the family operations" legal and illegal, and reflects "the strength of the bond
among family members which defines all others as 'outsiders.'").36 See Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee
Owed More Protection than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1990).37 See United States v. Baker, 4 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1993) (defendant claims that her
cooperation against a close relative exposed her to "'ostracism' and 'suspicion'" within her
extended family).
38 See Walter B. Miller, American Youth Gangs: A Reassessment, in RADZINOWICZ &
WoLPGANG, supra note 35, at 188, 194-95.
39 United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1376 n.76 (D.D.C. 1989), 925 F.2d
455 (1991) ("Whenever a defendant cooperates with law enforcement by identifying
confederates, his safety in the correctional system and elsewhere is in serious jeopardy."),
rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see, e.g.,
United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1254-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 326
(1994) (mafia boss orders murders of numerous associates suspected of cooperating).
40 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WNEs INTIMIDATION 3-7 (1985) (discussing cases of
physical retaliation against witnesses and their families); Nemerson, supra note 31, at 734
("[Mlost often the explanation for noncooperation is fear of reprisal against self, family, or
friends, or a misplaced sense of loyalty to past associates.").
41 Tate, supra note 36, at 11-12.
42 KENNETH MANN, DEFENDiNG WHTrE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATToRNEYs
AT WORK 172 (1985); see Stanley S. Arkin, Moral Issues and the Cooperating Wtness,
N.Y. LJ., June 9, 1994, at 3, 7 ("[Any businessman/informer must consider whether he
will be able to continue to pursue his trade once he fulfills his role as an informant.").
43 Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.. 1091, 1093 (1951).
Donnelly's title suggests the need for a definitional aside. Terms like: "snitch," "rat,"
"informer" and "informant" are all used to denote individuals who tell the police about the
wrongdoing of other people, but specific definitions vary. Donnelly says that an
"informant" is the type of "informer" who has participated in the offense he reports. Id. at
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former associates, but by all those around him, including the law enforcement
authorities who benefit most from his cooperation.44 Sanford Levinson tells
how John Ford's movie The Informer captures this popular response:
A British police officer disdainfully pushes with his walking stick the thirty-
pound reward-itself so obviously reminiscent of the thirty pieces of silver
given to the arch-betrayer Judas-toward Gypo Nolan, who has just conveyed
the whereabouts of his friend and political comrade to the British enemy. It is
as if the police officer were unwilling to risk the contamination that might arise
from even an accidental touching of flesh by physically handing over the
money.45
Where does this disdain for snitches come from? After all, while we
ordinarily condemn someone for betraying his associates for personal gain-or
mitigated hardship-the associates the cooperator betrays are, by assumption,
people involved in antisocial activity.46 A utilitarian calculus would applaud, or
1092. Victor Navasky follows what he considers "popular usage" and defines "an informer
as someone who betrays a comrade, i.e., a fellow member of a movement, a colleague, or
a friend, to the authorities." VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES xviii (1980). It seems
fair to say that a criminal defendant who agrees to give the government information about
his associates in exchange for leniency can safely be called a "snitch" or "informer" without
fear of terminological inexactitude.
44 See SKOLNICK, supra note 32, at 130 (officers in one police department would
officially call "informants" "special employees," but privately speak of "snitches");
MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORcmmENT 64 (2d ed.
1968) (former federal agents condemn "the police's acceptance of the underworld attitude
and vocabulary toward the informer").
The disdain police officers have for "snitches" may reflect their antipathy for
cooperators from within their own ranks. See ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
IssuEs AND IRONIES 82 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing "blue coat 'code of omerta,' a blanket of
silence that must be maintained among the police 'brotherhood' in the face of official
inquiry or review to shield one's colleagues"); Stan K. Shernock, The Effects of Patrol
Officers' Defensiveness Toward the Outside World on Their Ethical Onentations, 9 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 24, 25 ("'[B]lowing the whistle,' 'finking,' and
'squealing' are breaches of the 'code of silence' that represent the most heinous offense in
the police world.").
45 Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984
DUKE L.J 631, 635; see NAVASKY, supra note 43, at x-xi. Cinematic condemnations of
snitching are legion, with Scent of a Woman the most recent example. SCENT OF A WOMAN
(Universal Pictures 1992).
46 See William J. Bauer, Refiections on the Role of Statutory Irmunity in the Cnim'nal
Justice System, 67 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143, 143 (1976) ("MIhe informer, spy, or
accomplice witness is to be detested and hated only if one is willing to accept the fact that
the men 'betrayed' are not engaged in an act or acts that are socially destructive."); Gordon
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at least encourage, the snitch, regardless of his motivations or personal
allegiances. With the control of crime his paramount goal, Jeremy Bentham
went so far as to condemn, as "negative falsehood," the "concealment of any
fact of which, for the protection of their rights, individuals or the public have a
right to be informed." 47
Maybe the popular reaction to snitching reflects utilitarian concerns that
cooperators may not tell the truth or that the light sentences given to
cooperators undermine deterrence.48 Such considerations might explain the
notoriety of the defendant who, although far more culpable than his co-
conspirators, gets a far lighter sentence by testifying against them.49 But the
Tullock, The Prisoner's Dilenvna and Mu.a! Tnrst, 77 ETHIcs 229 (1967) (society as a
whole benefits when one prisoner, caught in "prisoner's dilemma" squeals on a fellow
prisoner).
In Roberts v. United States, the Court blithely proclaimed that "[c]oncealment of crime
has been condemned throughout our history," and found that "the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities." 445 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1980);
see United States v. Bell, 905 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (in rejecting plea for leniency
by defendant who found cooperation dishonorable, sentencing judge noted, "'How it is not
"honorable" to aid the Government in detection and prosecution of serious crimes... is
beyond the Court.'") (quoting United States v. Bell, Crim. No. 83-320-12 (D.D.C. Jan. 27,
1989), Memorandum Opinion at 6-7). But see Roberts, 445 U.S. at 570 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("If the Court's view of social mores were accurate, it would be hard to
understand how terms such as 'stool pigeon,' 'snitch,' 'squealer,' and 'tattletale' have come
to be the common description of those who engage in such behavior.").
47 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuIciAL EviDENcE 339-40 (1827). Bentham
also extolled the social utility of forcing wives to testify against their husbands: "[If] a man
could not carry on schemes of injustice, without being in danger, every moment, of being
disturbed in them,-and (if that were not... enough) betrayed and exposed to
punishment,-by his wife; injustice in all its shapes... would, in comparison of what it is
at present, be rare." Id.; see Nemerson, supra note 31, at 678-79, 684-85 (setting out
utilitarian justification for leniency to cooperators, but noting inadequacy of utilitarian
perspective as sentencing principle).
48 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 14-15 (addressing the utilitarian calculations that a
prosecutor should make before seeking a defendant's cooperation).
49 A consequence of the current scheme's rewards for cooperation is what one court
has called "inverted sentencing": "The more serious the defendant's crimes, the lower the
sentence-because the greater his wrongs, the more information and assistance he has to
offer to a prosecutor." United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); see
also United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J., dissenting)
("What kind of a criminal justice system rewards the drug kingpin or near-kingpin who
informs on all the criminal colleagues he or she has recruited, but sends to prison for years
and years the least knowledgeable or culpable conspirator, one who knows very little about
the conspiracy and is without information for the prosecutors?"); Steven J. Schulhofer,
Rethinking Mandatory Mininuans, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 199, 212 (1993) ("Minor
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depth of sentiment against snitches seems to go well beyond such calculations
and to be more consistent with a Kantian condemnation of a betrayal motivated
by personal gain. Even those wholly unfamiliar with the Categorical Imperative
can feel antipathy for those who profit by incriminating others.50
The assumption that defendants' reasons for cooperating are exclusively
selfish seems reasonable enough5' and alone can explain the public's disdain.
players, peripherally involved and with little knowledge or responsibility, have little to offer
and thus can wind up with far more severe sentences than the boss."); Antoinette M. Tease,
Downward Departures for Substantial Assistance: A Proposal for Reducing Sentencing
Disparties Among Codefendants, 53 MoNT. L. REV. 75, 88 (1992). But see Kobayashi,
supra note 21, at 508 (arguing that cooperation agreement leaving the most culpable
defendant with lowest sentence can maximize deterrence because increase in penalties
placed on subordinates will more than outweigh any decrease in the penalty placed on the
ringleader).
5 0 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations ofMorals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
140, 178 (Carl I. Friedrich ed., 1949) (A categorical imperative is to: "Act so as to treat
man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely
as a means."). Kant's theory of retributive punishment also would preclude the use of
sentencing incentives for cooperators. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSicAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 100 (1. Ladd trans., 1965) ("The law concerning punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of
happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from
punishment or by reducing the amount of it.... ."); see Nemerson, supra note 31, at 688-
89.
51 See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING F.B.I. AND NARCOTICS
AGENrs 65 (1978) ("A major motive-most investigators believe the major motive-of an
informant is to obtain leniency on a criminal charge in exchange for information about
accomplices involved in that charge or persons involved in other criminal offenses."). Other
motives may of course be present-or even dominate-in particular cases. See HARNY &
CROSS, supra note 44, at 41-59 (informing can be product of fear, revenge, ego, greed, and
even repentance, among other motivations). A recent newspaper article suggests a hierarchy
of values:
Tommy Bums has done some nasty deeds in his 32 years but he is no rat. He
wants everyone to be clear on that score. He knows how to keep his mouth shut.
And he wants everyone to be crystal clear about one more thing: The only reason
he is cooperating with Federal agents investigating deadly acts of cruelty and fraud in
the glittering showhorse business is that those rich skunks he worked for turned their
backs on him the second he got busted doing their dirty work.
Spilling his guts is his bittersweet revenge. It is also his only shot at shaving time
off a prison term.
Don Terry, On Killing Horses for Money: A Craftsman's Dirty Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
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After all, rare is the criminal associate who cooperates before he faces serious
charges; the snitch typically forces the government to "buy" information that
the "concerned citizen" would have freely given. But suspicion of the snitch's
motives may be only part of the story. What of the defendant who suddenly
rues his past ways and, in Kantian terms, proclaims, "I can no longer remain
true to someone or some group that acts with so much contempt for
humanity"? 52 During the McCarthy witch hunts, the alleged treason of a
witness's former associates was thought by many to justify, even glorify, his
act of betrayal. Richard Donnelly reported:
Curiously enough, the political informant, spy, or agent provocateur is not
now regarded with the same opprobrium as his brother who participates in
other types of crime. Public opinion being what it is, his credibility is at a
premium.... He may admit to all kinds of past knavery and mendacity but
the greater his self-debasement the greater his claim to belief. That he now acts
from patriotic motives is conclusively presumed.53
Those who so glorified McCarthy-era cooperators, however, as Victor
Navasky has insightfully explained, could do so only in the context of what
they perceived to be a national emergency, "an extreme situation
where... survival alone may count and moral considerations be
obliterated." 54 Where customary moral judgments are not suspended, the snitch
will be condemned as much for his act of betrayal as for his presumably selfish
motivation.
As Deborah Rhode has observed, "The public's distaste for tattling reflects
deeply rooted convictions about the value of trust and candor in human
relationships." 55 Perhaps the roots of these convictions lie in the ethic of the
schoolyard or the large family where those who break solidarity to report
others to authority figures will almost certainly face peer condemnation. But
the lessons of history are equally evocative. Nearly everyone has been touched
by a worthy cause that, at one time or another, has suffered at the hands of
snitches and carries the scars of such betrayals. Judas is seen as the patron saint
5, 1993, at 1.
52 FLETCHER, supra note 32, at 171.
53 Donnelly, supra note 43, at 1126.
5 4 NAVASKY, supra note 43, at 424. But see HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 44, at 17-
20 (former federal agents allege that "Communist conspiracy [had] launched an all-out
attack on the informer as an institution" and quoting other law enforcement authorities,
including J. Edgar Hoover, making similar allegations).
5 5 Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
613 (1985).
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of all informers, 56 and, as Navasky notes, "[tihe informer fares worse, if
anything, in the Jewish tradition." 57 Since the First Century, observant Jews
have thrice daily prayed that for "slanderers"-meaning informers-"let there
be no hope." 58 The treatment of Gypo Nolan in The Informer only begins to
convey the hatred that those of Irish ancestry have for his ilk.59 The causes
whose betrayal is recalled in these traditions have little in common with the
racketeering enterprises, insider-trading rings, and drug conspiracies betrayed
by the cooperating defendant. But the images remain, suggesting a valuation of
loyalty for its own sake, and creating a moral backdrop that every defendant
considering cooperation will face. 60
56 Sanford Levinson suggests that Judas's betrayal of Jesus was made of a "wholly
different magnitude" by Judas's willingness to return to Jesus's side and participate in the
Last Supper as a disciple even after having betrayed Jesus to the Roman authorities.
Levinson finds "an all-important distinction between the informer as 'snitch' and the
undercover agent." Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in
ABsCAM ETHIcs: MORAL IssuEs AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 43, 48-49 (Gerald
Caplan ed., 1983). Although I see the difference, I suspect that Judas's status in the
Christian tradition would be secure had he fingered Jesus but skipped the Supper.
57 NAVASKY, supra note 43, at xii.58 Joel Cohen, Informers: Does American Law Violate the Talmud's Precepts?, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 29, 1991, at 1, 4. Jewish witnesses refusing to testify in criminal proceedings
have unsuccessfully tried to avoid contempt citations by pointing, with considerable support,
to a Talmudic prohibition against testifying against another Jew. Id. at 32; see, e.g., United
States v. Martin, 525 F.2d 703, 710 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975);
United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 1973); Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d
802, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir.)
(witness notes reluctance to testify against defendants because "one of the cardinal rules
is... Jews aren't supposed to turn other Jews over"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993).
59 See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 44, at 4 ("Special antagonism to informers may
be attributed.., to the fact that the forebears of many of our citizens came to this country
one jump ahead of the process of the law. Many Americans of today have a sort of atavistic
hatred of the informer derived from a grandfather who evaded the 'Black and Tans' in
Ireland or the Kaiser's conscriptors in Germany.").
60See, e.g., United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993)
("Unfortunately-or indeed fortunately for the public in many cases--all co-defendants who
turn state's evidence and cooperate with the government, 'trade on,' or have traded on,
their fellow co-defendant's 'trust.'"); United States v. Bell, 905 F.2d 458, 459 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (defendant, arguing for leniency despite having refused to cooperate with
government, notes his reluctance to "'buy my freedom with somebody else's days'").
In the midst of a bitter alimony dispute with her husband, Seema Boesky noted that,
while her first reaction to news of Ivan Boesky's crimes was to "reach out to him," "the
most painful thing for me of all [was Boesky's] turning in friends." The Secrets of Ivan
Boesky (ABC television broadcast, May 15, 1992).
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B. The Rewards
Even as the defendant with first-hand information about the criminal
activities of others may face personal shame, physical or economic retaliation,
and social ostracism should he choose to cooperate, he can also look to a
substantial reward, in the form of a far lighter sentence than he otherwise
would have received.
The idea is not new, of course. Under the ancient English common law
practice of "approvement," an accused felon could implicate an accomplice and
win a pardon upon the accomplice's conviction. 61 Although this practice had
"fallen into disuse... by at least the mid-seventeenth century," it "remained
'a part of the common law'" to the extent that "whenever a felon was permitted
to testify against his accomplices, he gained 'an equitable title' to a pardon." 62
By 1878, this informal immunity arrangement-which allowed prosecutors to
control whether a defendant could obtain leniency, but not the extent of that
leniency-had become quite prevalent in the United States. 63 In more recent
times, while prosecutorial control over charging decisions and judicial
deference to prosecutorial recommendations have given prosecutors far more
flexibility in their negotiations with potential cooperators, the incentives offered
to such defendants have remained considerable. 64 Even when federal
61 See United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878) [hereinafter The Whiskey
Cases]; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARmS *330; 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 226-35 (S. Emlyn ed., 1736); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1979); Hughes, supra note 14,
at7.
62 Alschuler, supra note 61, at 14 (quoting Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331, 334-35, 98
Eng. Rep. 114, 116 (K.B. 1775) (Mansfield, J.)).
63 The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 599. "Courts of justice everywhere agree that the
established usage is that an accomplice duly admitted as a witness in a criminal prosecution
against his associates in guilt, if he testifies fully and fairly, will not be prosecuted for the
same offense...." Id. "When... [the accomplice] fulfills those conditions, he is
equitably entitled to a pardon, and the prosecutor, and the court if need be, when fully
informed of the facts, will join in such a recommendation." Id. at 604.
64 See ROBERT 0. DAWSON, SENTENcING: THE DECISIoN AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND
CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 184 (1969) (discussing extent of inducements given to informants
and testifying cooperators); HARNEY & CRoss, supra note 44, at 41 (same); DONALD J.
NEWMAN, CoNvICrIoN: THE DETERMINATION OF GuIT OR INNoCENCE WrHouT TRIL 187
(1966) ("The typical state's witness... is... only too happy to settle for charge and
sentencing leniency which, without such cooperation, would be inappropriate in view of his
past record and present involvement. The most common and sought-after reward for a
state's witness is probation on the current charge. This may be accomplished by a
sentencing promise alone or by charge reduction with a promise of probation.").
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sentencing law gave judges nearly complete discretion within very large
statutory ranges, they regularly, if not invariably, rewarded cooperators with
substantial sentencing discounts. 65
These discounts have become far more dramatic with the advent of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines-applicable to all offenses committed after
November 1, 1987.66 The stick is far heavier: Vastly curtailing judicial
sentencing discretion, the Guidelines, in a great many cases, have required the
imposition of longer sentences than before and, in all cases, have increased the
amount of prison time a sentenced defendant must actually serve. The
Guidelines operate against a statutory background of mandatory minimum
provisions, which for certain drug and weapons offenses require sentences even
higher than those set by the Guidelines.67 And the carrot is larger: A judge can
65 STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGmENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHrrF-
COLLAR CRPANALS 118-120 (1988); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570--
71 & n.9 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
67 Although as of 1991 there were approximately 100 separate federal mandatory
minimum penalty provisions located in 60 different criminal statutes, four statutes accounted
for approximately 94% of the 59,780 defendants sentenced under such provisions during the
period 1984-90. These four-21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), 21 U.S.C. § 844
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), 21 U.S.C. § 960 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)-all involve drugs and weapons offenses. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10
(1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MNIMUM PENALTIES]. A defendant can be subject to more
than one mandatory minimum: the distribution of 50 grams of crack cocaine by someone
who uses or carries a firearm in the course of that crime can, for example, mean a 15-year
minimum sentence-10 years for the drug offense, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988), and 5
years for the weapons offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Because of changes in enforcement patterns-like the targeting of more serious drug
offenders-and the interplay between the Guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums, it
is difficult to separate the effects of the Guidelines from those of the statutory provisions.
However, mean sentence lengths across all offenses increased from 24 months in July 1984
to 46 months in June 1990, with the proportion of defendants sentenced to prison increasing
from 52% to 65%. Mean prison terms for drug offenders increased from 27 months to 67
months, with the proportion of defendants sentenced to prison increasing from 72% to 87%.
The mean sentences for economic offenses remained about the same, but the rate of
imprisonment changed from 39% to 51%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND
SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 56-63 (1991) [hereinafter REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINE SYSTEM]; see Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of
Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 367
(1992).
[Vol. 56:69
COOPERATING CLIENTS
"depart" below the normal Guidelines sentence whenever the government has
certified that a defendant "provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 68 Congress has
also provided that such a government motion will allow a defendant to escape
being sentenced under otherwise applicable mandatory minimum provisions. 69
Although they merely authorize leniency for cooperators, and do not require it,
the provisions release judges from the constraints of a sentencing scheme that a
great many think is far too harsh.70 As a result, the cooperator who before the
Guidelines and mandatory minimums would have received a substantial
sentencing discount can now expect an even greater one. 71 And the defendant
68 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
69 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). The Supreme Court has yet to resolve a spit in the
circuits as to whether the government can say that a defendant has rendered "substantial
assistance" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but not of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)-and
thereby allow him to be sentenced below the Guideline level but not the mandatory
minimum. Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992); see United States v.
Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78, 83 (5th Cir. 1994) (court joins "majority of circuits which hold that
the district court may depart below a mandatory minimum irrespective of whether the
departure motion is made under either § 51(1.1 or § 3553(e)"). Compare United States v.
Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the court is free to treat
§ 5K1.1 motion as one also under § 3553(e), even over government's objection) and United
States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1991) (same) with United States v.
Rodriguez-Morales, 958 F.2d 1441, 1443 (8th Cir.) (holding separate motions by
government needed), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 375 (1992).
70 See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, FED. SENT. REP., July-Aug. 1992, at 6, 7 (Section 5K1.1 is "[t]he
most important avenue" for judge seeking a basis for departing below a Guidelines
sentence.). Of 49 district judges and one magistrate judge surveyed, six complained that the
Guidelines were too harsh. REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM, supra
note 67, at 16. A different survey of 48 judges found 18 complaining that mandatory
minimums were too harsh. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 67, at 93-94.
Many judges have criticized the severity of the Guidelines as a general matter. See Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion
of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685-86 n.10 (1992) (collecting citations); Deborah
Pines, Judges Cite Rules' Harshness, Rigidity; Esoteric Wrangles Extend the Process, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 4, 1992, at 1 (reporting complaints of New York area judges about harshness of
Sentencing Guidelines). Far more have spoken out against particular results in specific
cases.
71 See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1471, 1506 n.111 (1993) (Sentencing Guidelines, and § 5K1.1 in particular, "do not
explicitly add to the discretion of prosecutors but instead render the prosecutor's traditional
exercises of discretion more influential in the final disposition of the case.").
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who refuses to cooperate effectively pays a far greater price for his silence.72
72 See John D.B. Lewis, Cooperation Under the Guidelines, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 30, 1993,
at 2 (defense attorney assails a "pernicious component of the federal sentencing scheme: the
emphasis on informing... as the only avenue of escape available to those confronted with
the guidelines' Draconian sentences"); Schulhofer, supra note 49, at 211-12
("[Miandatories coupled with an exception for cooperation provide powerful inducements
for assistance that might not otherwise be forthcoming."). In 1991, substantial assistance
motions by the government was a reason cited in 68.7% of all downward departures in
country; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 137.
The Violent Crime and Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), has made it possible for certain narcotics
defendants to avoid statutory mandatory minimums without cooperating against other
individuals. Title VIII of that Act provides that a defendant charged with drug trafficking
crimes "shall" be sentenced "without regard to any statutory mandatory minimum
sentence," if the court finds, after hearing from the government, that (1) the defendant
"does not have more than I criminal history point... " i.e., if convicted once before, has
never served more than sixty days in prison, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1; "(2) the defendant did
not use [or threaten] violence.., or possess a firearm... in connection with the offense;"
(3) he was not "an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense"; and
(4) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully
provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common
scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other
information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall
not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this
requirement.
Violent Crime and Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, tit. VIII, sec. 80001, H.R.
3355, 103rd Cong., 2d ses., 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988)).
This provision will permit a defendant with little or no information to "sell" to the
government to avoid the mandatory minimums (but not the Sentencing Guidelines). What
remains to be seen, however, is whether it will reduce the government's leverage over
defendants who can cooperate. I suspect that any such reduction will not be substantial. The
readiness of many, if not most, judges to defer, for sentencing purposes, to the
government's assessment of a defendant's truthfulness, see infra note 124, will make it
difficult for a potential cooperator who falsely tells the government that he has little or no
information about others to avoid the mandatory minimums. Moreover, even if he can fool
the prosecutor, or at least persuade the judge to ignore the government's recommendation,
he will still face a Guideline sentence that will likely (although perhaps not always) be much
higher than the sentence he could expect as a cooperator. This last reason will also make it
unlikely that a potential cooperator ready to tell the truth about others would opt to rely on
the new provision, instead of a cooperation agreement. Given that, after this defendant has
proffered useful information about others, the government might immunize him and force
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II. COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATIORNEY
Were he to have the simple option of selling out his criminal associates in
exchange for a substantial and specified sentencing discount, a defendant would
face a difficult enough moral dilemma. But his choice is unlikely to be so stark,
or the consequences so clear. Not even the classic model of the "prisoner's
dilemma"-which factors the actions of co-conspirators into the problem-
captures the complexities of the defendant's decisional matrix. The defendant
may know that the government is interested in his cooperation, but he may not
know exactly how much the government is willing to "pay" for it in sentencing
discounts. And even when he knows the "price," he will typically have to
perform, i.e., testify, before he ever gets paid and will have inadequate legal
remedies against governmental bad faith. In short, even for the most
knowledgeable defendant, the decision to cooperate will be a leap into the
unknown. In this situation, the advice of a defense attorney will be critical,
perhaps dispositive. As a repeat player in the market where the government
"buys" information, she can provide not merely expert guidance, but a high
degree of certainty.
A. The Real Prisoner's Dilemma
One dimension of the potential cooperator's calculus that has been missing
from our discussion so far is the potential for reciprocal betrayal: The
associates against whom the defendant can cooperate probably can themselves
implicate the defendant in exchange for leniency. This additional element is
dramatically portrayed in that most famous of cooperation quandaries, the
prisoner's dilemma:
Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each
prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging
messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to
convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in
prison on the lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a
Faustian bargain. If he testifies against his partner, he will go free while the
partner will get three years in prison on the main charge.... If both prisoners
testify against each other, both will be sentenced to two years injail.73
him to testify against those others, such a course would seem to have all the liabilities of
cooperation, without the benefits.
73 WILLtAm POUNDSTONE, PRiSoNER'S DILEMMA 118 (1992); see also ANATOL
RAPOPORT & ALBERT CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DIMMA 24-25 (1965).
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If the two prisoners act rationally, each will cooperate, reasoning "'[tiestifying
takes a year off my sentence, no matter what the other guy does.'" 74 But
consider the model's assumptions: (1) the defendant cannot communicate with
his co-defendant; (2) the police have given him a reasonably precise indication
of the strength of the evidence against him, and (3) he knows the exact payout
for each of his options, with each payout quantifiable solely in length of
sentence. This is not the world that the real defendant faces.
Dropping the first assumption-and positing that the defendants can
communicate directly or through lawyers-may make the least difference, as
long as each defendant is represented by a different lawyer.75 If each attorney
is loyal only to her client, 76 the prisoner's dilemma, as Pam Karlan has pointed
out, "may simply be played out at a different level. Each attorney will advise
her client to cooperate with the prosecutor, because none can be sure that the
other defendants' lawyers are not agreeing to stonewall while secretly planning
to claim the prosecutor's offer for their clients." 77 In the absence of complete
trust-at a time when the bonds of loyalty will be severely tested-altering the
model to allow for communication between defendants likely will change little.
Where the classic game-theory model diverges most from reality is in its
second two assumptions-that the government will announce the strength of its
case and that the defendant will know the precise payouts of his options.
Relaxing these assumptions renders the hypothetical prisoner's decisional
matrix infinitely more complex. Perhaps the government's case is so weak that
the defendant might take the case to trial, obtain an acquittal and face no
punishment. Or the government is soliciting his cooperation only to make an
overwhelming case even stronger (perhaps to avoid a trial); should both he and
his co-defendant refuse to cooperate, both might face the harshest sentence. The
government might refuse to set a precise payout for cooperation, conditioning
unspecified leniency upon the extent to which the defendant gives "truthful"
information. Or there might be a real risk that, having imposed such a
condition-with or without a specified payout-the government will later act in
bad faith to deprive the defendant of the promised leniency. Moreover, even
were a defendant to know precisely what his sentence would be were he to
cooperate, fear of the condemnation or retaliation often faced by snitches could
74 POUNMONIO, supra note 73, at 118 (emphasis omitted).
75 Should the two prisoners share the same lawyer, she can coordinate a strategy of
solidarity, or, at the very least, ensure that each prisoner knows exactly what the other is
doing. In the absence of ignorance on this score, the dilemma disappears. See Stuntz, supra
note 22, at 799 ("If all the conspirators have the same lawyer, the government is, in effect,
able to deal with one defendant only by dealing with all.").
76 1 will completely abandon this assumption of loyalty later. See infra part Ill.
7 7 Karlan, supra note 10, at 694.
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introduce an element of uncertainty into the effective payout. 78
To put aside the simple matrix of the hypothetical is to recognize the
critical role that a defense attorney must play in the cooperation decision, not
simply as an experienced technical adviser, but as a monitor, even a guarantor,
of the government's performance.
B. The Ordinary Plea Decision: The Minimization of Uncertainty
The extent of uncertainty that the potential cooperator faces-and the
critical role his lawyer must play-can best be appreciated by comparing his
position with that of a defendant who lacks the ability to cooperate against
anyone.
Soon after the defendant with no information to trade has been formally
charged, he will probably be able to exchange his valuable right to a jury trial
for some sort of sentencing concession. Should he choose not to cut a deal, he
will risk a guilty verdict and a higher sentence. 79 Although under the discovery
rules prevalent in the federal system and in most states, the government may
not have to reveal much about its case,80 and statutory sentencing ranges are
generally quite wide, the defendant will be able to rely on his defense attorney,
who, having seen many such cases, "is likely to have a good sense of the
'market price' for any particular case."81 With this expertise, she can negotiate
with the government and obtain its best offer. Thereafter, she can give the
defendant a reasonably good idea of the available payouts and of his chances of
obtaining them.
A plea agreement with the government will vastly reduce, if not eliminate,
any uncertainty the defendant faces. To be sure, given that plea agreements
often do not bind judges to specific sentences, the defendant may be in
78 The standard model of the prisoner's dilemma assumes that "neither player has
moral qualms about, or fear of, squealing." ROBERT AXELROD, Tim EvOLUIrON OF
COOPERATION 125 (1984). If the two prisoners "belonged to an organized crime gang, they
could anticipate being punished for squealing. This might lower the payoffs for double-
crossing their partner so much that neither would confess... ." Id. at 133.
79 A far more interesting and detailed discussion of risk allocation by the defendant
considering a guilty plea can be found in Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15.
80 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRPMNAL PROCERE 846-57 (2d ed.
1992); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANiEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
751-60 (4th ed. 1992); CHARLEs H. Whrm READ & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOIN, CRIMIAL
PROCEDURE 588-91 (3d ed. 1993); Susan Fleming, Note, Defendant Access to Prosecution
Witnes Statements in Federal and State Cininal Cases, 61 WAsH. U. L.Q. 471 (1983).
81 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1923; see MILTON HUEMANN, PLEA BARGAINING
90(1978).
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jeopardy until he actually has been sentenced.82 But, having resolved the case
without trial, bound the government to a particular sentencing position, and
consulted with his lawyer about the judge's track record in such cases, the
defendant should have a good idea of what to expect. 83 This is especially true
in those jurisdictions, like the federal system, with mandatory sentencing
guidelines that substantially reduce the judge's discretion.
Much of the comfort that a defendant can take from a plea bargain stems
from the similarity of that arrangement to a classic executory contract. 84 The
parties agree on the way that the case will be presented to the sentencing judge;
this may entail charge reduction, joint presentation of facts that will be relevant
to sentencing, or other signals that a sentencing discount is appropriate. The
defendant will enter his guilty plea. Then he will be sentenced. There is
generally no particular need to trust in the government's good faith. Either the
plea agreement itself or standard legal rules will likely address all contingencies
that might arise in the relatively short period between the defendant's plea and
his sentencing. 85 Moreover, should the government renege on the agreement,
by urging a sentencing position that it has bargained away, the defendant will
likely find out about the violation 86 and will be able to seek the withdrawal of
82 In the federal system, the court is prohibited from participating in plea negotiations.
FED. R. CiuM. P. ll(e)(1). Even when the parties agree on a specific sentence, the court is
still free to reject the agreement and give the defendant a chance to withdraw his plea. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C), 11(e)(2). Practices vary among local jurisdictions. See JAMES S.
KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKNG OF A CRImINAL LAWYER
169 (1983) ("In Washington you can bargain for the prosecutor to support, or at least not
oppose, a particular sentence, but ultimately you roll the dice not knowing what the judge
will impose. In New York City the judge makes a promise about sentencing before the
defendant has to decide whether to plead."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in
Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1092-95 (1976) (finding that majority
of judges observed in state systems refused to commit themselves to specific sentences
before accepting pleas, even though they made clear that there was an advantage to
pleading).
83 See Alschuler, supra note 82, passim (discussing extents to which judges in 10
major urban jurisdictions conveyed information before a plea concerning a defendant's
likely sentence).
84 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1922 ("ITIhe typical plea bargain is strikingly
similar to the simple dickered bargain-my car for $500-that is the staple example of
enforceable exchange in contract law.").
85 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 1090 (In classic executory contracts, "[a]ll
relevant risks... can be assigned optimally-either by legal rule or through individualized
agreement-because future contingencies are not only known and understood at the time the
bargain is struck, but can also be addressed by efficacious contractual response.").
86 Sealed ev parte sentencing presentations by the government present special
difficulties because the defendant will not be able to monitor their content. See United States
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his plea or the enforcement of the agreement.87
As a result of the executory nature of the typical plea bargain, the main job
of the defense attorney in the process is to serve as an educated purchasing
agent: finding out the "prices" being offered for pleas, ensuring that the offer is
for the best possible price under the circumstances, and arranging the deal
according to settled "market" conventions. The fact that defense attorneys are,
as Bill Stuntz has noted, "repeat players with whom the government must deal
often,"88 certainly gives the government an added reason to abide by its plea
agreements.89 But the simple terms of the typical plea bargain and the
availability of remedies that will either give the defendant the benefit of his
bargain or return him to his original position90 make the issue of trust a
v. Alverado, 909 F.2d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a court must provide
defendant with summary of confidential information heard in camera sufficient for
defendant to evaluate truthfulness).
87 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). As a constitutional matter, and
within the federal system, if the defendant shows that the government has breached the plea
agreement, choice of the appropriate remedy lies with the court, which can allow
withdrawal of the plea, alteration of the sentence, or specific performance of the agreement.
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Jeffries,
908 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Parker, 895 F.2d 908, 914 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990); see also Westen & Westin, supra note 19, at 512-
28 (arguing for rule that allows defendant to select specific performance).
I have doubtless presented an overly rosy picture of the likelihood that an actually
aggrieved defendant can obtain satisfaction. Where the government makes the promised
sentencing recommendation, but undercuts it by presenting or highlighting facts that lead the
judge to impose a harsher sentence, courts will frequently not find a breach. Neither is the
government obliged to be "enthusiastic" when making the promised recommendation. See
United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) (per curiam) (government not required to
"enthusiastically" defend its sentencing recommendation where it did not specifically
promise to do so); Twenty-Second Annual Review of Crninal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L. 853, 1185 n.1323 (1993)
(collecting cases). My point is simply that standards for enforcement are far clearer for plea
agreements than for cooperation agreements.
88 Stuntz, supra note 22, at 832-33.
8 9 SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMNAL LAWYER 53 (1981) (One defense
lawyer regards lying by a prosecutor "as a personal betrayal to be dealt with personally-
we'll get the lying son of a bitch ourselves, if not in this particular case, then in some
subsequent one. And in the meantime, we quickly passed the word to watch out for the
deceitful bastard.-).
90 The defendant given his plea back may find himself in an even better position than
he started, because the government's case may have deteriorated in the intervening time.
See Bruce A. Green, "Hare and Hounds": The Fugitive Defendant's Constitutional Right to
be Pursued, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 439, 507 n.290 (1990) (T]he passage of time is more
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secondary one.
C. Cooperation: A Leap into Uncertainty
In contrast to the defendant choosing simply between plea and trial, the
defendant who has testimony or information to "sell" must consider a leap into
uncertainty. Everyone knows that, as a class, cooperators get big sentencing
breaks. 91 However, at the time he is contemplating whether to cooperate, a
defendant typically will not know how large a discount he can expect, nor can
he be sure that, were he to satisfy his part of the bargain, he would get a
discount at all.
Nothing about cooperation inherently compels this state of affairs. One can
imagine a scheme in which a defendant interested in cooperating would give the
government a summary of the information he has to sell, protected by a side
agreement that would bar the government from using the information against
him if negotiations break down. 92 Alternatively, the defendant's lawyer could
make a proffer of this information. Were the government willing to deal, an
agreement could be struck obliging the defendant to plead guilty to certain
charges and to testify or give information truthfully at the government's
request; in exchange, the government would agree to make a sentencing
presentation designed to give the defendant a precise discount commensurate
with the value of his information. The defendant could then be sentenced before
he actually testified in a single trial. If, thereafter, he reneged on his
obligations, he could be prosecuted anew, for perjury in his trial testimony, for
any charge dropped in consideration of his promise to cooperate, or for both.93
likely to hurt the prosecution than the defense which, after all, has no obligation to call
witnesses or present evidence but need only, and in many cases does only, put the
government to its proof.").
91 See Hughes, supra note 14.
92 Such proffer agreements are routinely used during cooperation negotiations. See id.
at 41; L. Felipe Restrepo, To Be or Not to Be a Cooperating Defendant, 7 CRIM. JUSTICE
22, 23-24 (Winter 1993). For an example of one such agreement, see Hughes, supra note
14, at 42 n.150. These agreements augment the protection already provided by the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 56 Crim. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2113 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1995) (FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(6) and FED. RULE EviD.
410(4), barring admission against defendant of statements made during plea discussions,
"'permit the plea bargainer to maximize what he has "to sell" by preserving 'the ability to
withdraw from the bargain proposed by the prosecutor without being harmed by any of his
statements made in the course of an aborted plea bargaining session.'") (quoting United
States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993)).
93 In Mezzanatto, 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2113 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1995), the Supreme
Court recently addressed the extent which to the government can condition its readiness to
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Such arrangements, allowing the defendant about as much certainty as in
ordinary plea agreements, are rarely available, because they do not serve the
government's interests-and may not even serve most defendants' interests.
Above all, the government's fear is that a defendant who has received his
reward up front will perjure himself-give an account at odds with the "true"
account that led the government to enter the cooperation agreement-when it
comes time to testify against his former criminal associates. To deter
defendants from "recanting," the government needs a mechanism in place that
promises swift and certain punishment for such conduct. An agreement that
requires the government to pursue a defector in a separate criminal trial94-
and, for those charges dismissed pursuant to the agreement, to prove breach of
the agreement before even getting before a jury95-- does not fit this bill. 96 The
hear a putative cooperator's proffer on that defendant's waiver of the protections of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) and FED. R. EvID. 410. Notwithstanding defendant's claim that these
protections were nonwaivable, the Court upheld an agreement permitting the government to
use his proffer statements to "impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial if
the case proceded that far." Mezzanatto, 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2114. Such
agreements, the dissent noted, are quite common. Id. at 2120 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
rules already allow the use of proffer statements "in a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in
the presence of counsel." FED. R. EviD. 410; FED. R. CIUM. P. 11(e)(6). An issue
remains as to whether the government could demand a waiver that would allow the use of
proffer statements in its case-in-chief in a trial on charges besides perjury and false
statement. Three of the seven Justices in the Mezzanatto majority noted that such a waiver
"would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby
undermine plea bargaining." Id. at 2118 (Ginsberg, L, concurring). Even assuming that
some limits are placed on the sort of waivers that the government can demand from a
putative cooperator, Mezzanatto thus upholds the government's power to place reneging
cooperators at a severe evidentiary disadvantage in any subsequent prosecution.
94 Where the defendant is given a lower sentence based on his promise to cooperate
reneges on that promise, the government-in the federal system, at least-will not be able to
get him resentenced to a harsher term without either trying him or getting him to plead
guilty again. Even if a cooperation agreement were drafted either to deny the defendant any
legitimate expectation in his sentence's finality, see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117 (1980), or simply to constitute a waiver of the defendant's double jeopardy rights, no
provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes resentencing in such
circumstances. See FED. R. CRlM. P. 35; United States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512 (5th Cir.
1994).
95 Before proceeding on charges otherwise barred by a plea agreement, the
government must prove the defendant's breach by a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 894 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v.
Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 578 (1st Cir.) ("adequate evidence" standard), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir.
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most efficient way for the government to keep some hold over the defendant is
to postpone sentencing until after his cooperation.97
A similar concern that a defendant have an incentive to testify "at his best"
also leads the government to prefer an agreement that does not specify how
much leniency a defendant can expect for his cooperation. Such vagueness
allows the ultimate sentencing discount to be commensurate with the degree of
cooperation the defendant has actually rendered and allows the government to
1976) (same).
96 Pejury prosecutions can be particularly difficult. If the government had easily
presented independent proof that the defendant's original account was true, it probably
would not have entered a cooperation agreement with the defendant in the first place. The
desire to avoid separate enforcement proceedings explains why the government so much
prefers cooperation agreements to statutory grants of immunity.
This is not to say that the prosecution will never decide to incur the expenses of a trial
against a cooperator who has breached his agreement. In Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1
(1987), Adamson's cooperation agreement provided that he would be sentenced "at the
conclusion of his testimony in all of the cases referred to in the agreement." Id. at 14. He
testified against two co-conspirators, and was thereafter sentenced. But the co-conspirators'
convictions were overturned on appeal. When Adamson refused to testify at the retrials
without additional consideration, the state declared him in breach of his agreement, moved
to vacate his guilty plea, and indicted him on capital murder charges. Id. at 4-7. The
Supreme Court upheld his death sentence. Id.
97 Although a handful of state courts "have tried to curb the dangers of pejured
testimony by requiring that the State execute its promises to the witness before he
testifies,... the great weight of modem authority, particularly in the federal courts, is that,
in guilty-plea cases, the postponement of plea and sentence is unobjectionable." Hughes,
supra note 14, at 24-25; see State v. DeWitt, 286 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1979) ("The
cases are legion which recognize that the State may withhold its quid until the accomplice
produces his or her quo."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980).
In Sheiff, Hmnboldt County v. Acuna, the Nevada Supreme Court overruled Franklin
v. State, where it had barred the withholding of the benefits of cooperation until after a
witness had testified. The court now observed:
If the State is required to provide the benefit of the bargain prior to the time the
promisee testifies at trial, the State's expectations may be frustrated by an uncooperative
or "forgetful" witness. Although it is true, as observed by the court in Franklin, that
withholding the benefit of the bargain until after the promisee testifies may create
pressure to testify in a particular manner, it would be neither realistic nor fair to expect
the State to enter into a bargain without assurances that the promisee's trial testimony
would be consistent with the information he or she provided the prosecutors as a basis
for leniency.
Sheriff, Humboldt County v. Acuna, 819 P.2d 197, 199 (Nev. 1991), overruling Franklin
v. State, 577 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978).
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avoid a stark choice between rewarding the defendant whose cooperation has
been grudging and ripping up his agreement.98 Moreover, the government
might not be able to assess a cooperator's "value" with any precision e ante.
A defendant might, for example, be averse to disclosing valuable information
for which his testimony might not be needed-like a bank account number-
during a pre-agreement proffer,99 or the government might not know enough
about its case at that stage to ask the right questions.
The uncertainty that the government prefers in its cooperation agreements
also reflects the fact that the document is designed to be seen not just by its
parties but by the jury considering the cooperator's testimony. A vague
agreement permits a witness who has admitted his involvement in heinous
crimes to say, "I honestly don't know what sentence I will receive. I hope for
leniency, but it's up to the judge." While defense counsel will try to educate
the jury about the likelihood that the witness will receive exceptional leniency-
and that the government will have considerable control over the extent of that
leniency-the expectation is that jurors will be less likely to be put off by the
"deal" than if the agreement set out a precise discount. 100
98 Of course, the incentives for the defendant to give "truthful" testimony may also
lead him to give a false account that he believes-correctly or not-the government would
prefer to hear. A discussion of such dangers, and how they should be addressed-e.g., jury
instructions and corroboration requirements-is beyond the scope of this Article. See
Hughes, supra note 14, at 29-40; Christine J. Saverda, Note, Accomplices in Federal
Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J 785 (1990); Sheldon R.
Shapiro, Annotation, Necesity of, and Prejuditcial Effect of Omiting, Cautionary
Instructions to Jury as to Accomplice's Tesmaony Against Defendant in Federal Criminal
Tial, 17 A.L.R. FED. 249 (1973). Agreements that appear to condition leniency on a
particular result, like a conviction or the return of an indictment, can be particularly
dangerous. See Yvette A. Berman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 809-12 (1987); Neil B. Eisenstadt, Note, Let's
Make a Deal: A Look at United States v. Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation
Agreements, 67 B.U. L. REV. 749 (1987).
9 9 See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 282 (1991) (The pre-plea written proffer
that Ivan Boesky's attorney gave the government identified the targets of his cooperation
only as "investment banker A," "investment bank B," and so on. When the government
appeared reluctant to enter into an agreement, Boesky's lawyer "offered to reveal orally the
identities of everyone mentioned in the proffer, though he wouldn't put the names in
writing.").
100 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 22 n.74 ("A prosecutor may prefer not to have a
written agreement that makes precise promises because its absence may strengthen the
position of the witness before the jury."); see also United States v. French, 12 F.3d 114,
116-17 (8th Cir. 1993) (Expert testimony "that witnesses who testify after signing plea
agreements that contain substantial-assistance provisions are more likely to incriminate the
defendant falsely in order to receive the reduction" is not appropriate because such a
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The government's interest in a vague and delayed payout will not always
dictate the form that an agreement takes. Special circumstances or the demands
of a particular defendant with substantial bargaining power may lead to a
different arrangement. 10 1 Michael Milken's agreement, for example, first had
him sentenced and then allowed him to seek a reduction in his sentence once he
had cooperated. 102 Payouts may also need to be made up front in those
jurisdictions where a cooperator's sentence, by statute or custom, will primarily
be determined by the nature of the charges he has pleaded to, irrespective of his
cooperation.103 Alternatively, prosecutors may also find themselves obliged to
use a combination of immediate and delayed payouts: A defendant can
immediately plead to lesser charges that reduce his sentencing exposure but
carry a sentencing range wide enough to give the defendant an incentive to
proposition is a "matter of common sense.").
101 The extent of a defendant's bargaining power will depend on (1) the perceived
likelihood that the defendant will take the case to trial if a cooperation agreement is not
reached, and (2) the value of his testimony or information, measured in terms of
government resources that would have to be expended to obtain a similar result (like the
conviction of a co-defendant) in the absence of his cooperation, or the cost (economic,
political, etc.) of a prosecution that will have to be foregone.
102 Letter Agreement (Apr. 22, 1990), United States v. Milken, No. 89 Cr. 41
(KMW) (copy of Letter Agreement on file with author). Milken's sentence was governed by
the version of FED. R. CUM. P. 35(b) that allowed a court substantial flexibility in reducing
a sentence after its imposition. The agreement also allowed the government to seek civil or
criminal contempt sanctions against Milken if he failed to comply with its provisions. For an
account suggesting that the terms of Milken's agreement, and the parties' interpretation of
them, allowed Milken to obtain a substantial reduction in his sentence with minimal
cooperation, see James B. Stewart, Michael Milken's Biggest Deal, Naw YORKER, Mar. 8,
1993, at 58.
Although Rule 35(b) has since been amended, it still permits sentencing reductions for
defendants who have rendered "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense," which is the same standard of U.S.S.G.
§ 5Kl.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). The rule thus permits an initial sentencing that
does not take a defendant's cooperation into account, to be followed by a resentencing-
after the defendant has actually cooperated-in which his sentence can be cut. Because,
from a defendant's perspective, agreements relying on this scheme raise essentially the same
enforcement issues as those in which sentencing is delayed, I do not discuss them
separately.
103 Agreements can delay cooperation payouts even in systems where sentencing
ranges are closely limited by the charges of conviction. See People v. Alzate, 598 N.Y.S.2d
564 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (defendant initially pled guilty to greater charge on
understanding that the prosecution would allow him to replead to a less serious charge if it
deemed his cooperation satisfactory).
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perform his part of the bargain. l1 4 The point is simply that the government will
seek to keep the payout as uncertain as it can. Indeed, the government's risk
aversion may lead defendants to prefer uncertainty as well, because if forced to
commit himself to a precise payout and/or immediate sentencing, a prosecutor
would be less likely to be lenient, for fear that a defendant would renege or that
the agreement would play badly before a jury.1 5
The consequence of this convergence of interests is that cooperation
agreements will typicallyl0 6 be quite clear in setting out the charges a defendant
will have to plead to and the scope of his immunity, but will often be quite
vague as to what leniency the defendant can expect in exchange for his
cooperation. This is generally the practice under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.107 The government will simply covenant to inform the sentencing
104 See, e.g., United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 958 (1989); United States v. Gotti, No. CR 90-1051 (E.D.N.Y.), Tr. 4481-82 (Mar.
5, 1992) (testimony of Salvatore Gravano) (Gravano, the main witness against John Gotti,
was promised a sentence capped at 20 years, instead of the life imprisonment that he might
have faced had he not cooperated.).
105 See KUNN, supra note 82, at 69 (recounting case in which prosecutor's agreement
to dismiss charges against witness "would render her testimony practically worthless"; by
"agree[ing] not to reach an agreement" and relying on "'an understanding' that if [the
witness]... testified, [the prosecutor]... would 'take into account' the fact that she had
cooperated," defense counsel was able to get more favorable treatment for client); Hughes,
supra note 14, at 22 n.74 ("If the prosecutor has a trustworthy and generous track record in
this area, the cooperating witness's counsel may advise him that it is safe and even
advantageous to proceed without a written agreement, since, if he does his best for the
government, the prosecutor ultimately may give him a greater reward than the prosecutor
would have promised in a written agreement at an early stage.").
Although the defendant who intends to act in bad faith would obviously prefer his
rewards up front, I assume throughout that, although the government may not know it, the
defendant is proceeding in good faith and intends to give truthful cooperation. One defense
lawyer has suggested, however, that "open-ended" agreements can serve the interests of
grudging cooperators by encouraging them "to bring in as much as possible," thereby
making leniency more likely. Jerald W. Cloyd, Prosecution's Power, Procedural Rights,
and Pleading Guilty: The Problem of Coercion in Plea Bargaining Drug Cases, 26 Soc.
PROBS. 452, 461 (1979).
106 1 do not pretend to have conducted systematic research into the terms of
cooperation agreements in use. The description here is largely based on anecdotal evidence
from cases, articles, a randomly assembled collection of agreements from various
jurisdictions, and my own experience in one federal district. The similarities of provisions
alluded to in caselaw, however, do suggest some patterns.
107 One practitioner advises:
Defense attorneys must make it clear to their client(s) that because of the guidelines'
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judge of the extent of the defendant's cooperation, and leave the matter in her
hands.10 8
Even where a cooperation agreement sets a precise payout, 109 a defendant
will face considerable uncertainty so long as his sentencing is delayed.
Typically, the defendant will broadly promise to testify truthfully, and to
truthfully disclose all information concerning matters covered by the
structure, neither the defense nor the prosecution is in a position to promise a specific
result at sentencing. This particular aspect of cooperation is perhaps the most difficult
for defendants to understand. They usually ask for a guarantee of a lesser sentence up
front, prior to their proffer of the evidence. It may sometimes be possible to negotiate a
[plea under FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(1)(C)], which includes a negotiated sentence or a
cap on the client's exposure in exchange for cooperation, although prosecutors are
generally reluctant to agree to such a plea.
Restrepo, supra note 92, at 25. But see Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Negotiated
Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. I CIM.
L. 231, 269-70 (1989) (noting that some prosecutors seek greater certainty than available
under § 5Kl.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by restructuring charges).
108 The standard agreement recently used in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of New York provides, "[i]f the Office determines that [the cooperator] has
cooperated fully, provided substantial assistance to law enforcement authorities and
otherwise complied with the terms of this agreement, the Office will file a motion with the
sentencing court setting forth the nature and extent of [his] cooperation." Hughes, supra
note 14, at 38 n. 143; see, e.g., United States v. Atwood, 963 F.2d 476, 477 (1st Cir. 1992)
(government promises to make defendant's cooperation known to any individual or entity,
at defendant's request; both parties "reserve] the right to petition the district court 'for the
imposition of any lawful sentence"); Letter Agreement at 9-10 (July 3, 1991), United
States v. Wright, No. CR 91-376 (D.D.C.) (copy of Letter Agreement on fie with author)
(government promises defendant no specific sentence, and reserves right to recommend
maximum allowable term of imprisonment); Letter Agreement at 7 (Oct. 29, 1990),
United States v. Profeta, No. CR 90-449 (D.D.C.) (copy of Letter Agreement on file with
author) (similar provision in case where maximum allowable term was life imprisonment
without parole).
109 Surveying three federal districts, Nagel and Schulhofer report that, in one, the
reward for substantial assistance "is structured as a section 5Kl.1 motion coupled with an
agreement for a specific sentence below the guideline range." lene H. Nagel & Stephen I.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Oties: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 532 (1992).
Sentences were not specified in the other two districts. But see, e.g., United States v.
Roberts, 5 F.3d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreement obliges government to recommend
that defendant's sentence be cut in half); United States v. Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131, 133 (7th
Cir. 1993) (agreement calls for 25% downward departure from presumptive Guidelines
range).
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government's inquiries. 110 Any effort to bind a cooperator to a particular
"story" would be unseemly, and probably illegal. 111 The government will
reserve for itself the right to determine, prior to sentencing, whether the
defendant has in fact cooperated fully and told the truth. 112 Ordinarily, this
reservation might simply mean that the government would retain control over
what it tells the sentencing judge about the defendant's cooperation. Given that
a judge would be likely to rely heavily on a prosecutor's assessment of such
matters, this would be a substantial enforcement mechanism. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have strengthened the government's hand even more,
however, by providing that cooperation generally cannot be a basis for a
departure below the Guidelines range or a statutory minimum except when the
government makes an explicit motion certifying that the defendant has indeed
rendered "substantial assistance." 113 Harnessing this power, the government
110 See Letter Agreement at 3 (Oct. 29, 1990), United States v. Profeta, No. CR 90-
449 (D.D.C.) (copy of Letter Agreement on file with author); Berman, supra note 98, at
801; Eisenstadt, supra note 98, at 750-51 & n.6; Hughes, supra note 14, at 38.
111 Efforts by prosecutors to bind a defendant to a particular version of events have
often been condemned or struck down as contrary to public policy. See State v. Fisher, 859
P.2d 179, 183 (Ariz. 1993) (By conditioning cooperator's plea on her agreement that her
testimony at her husband's trial "would not vary substantially in relevant areas" from
statements she had previously given to investigators, prosecution "may have overstepped the
bounds of the law and its ethical responsibility to 'scrupulously avoid any suggestion
calculated to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to
affect his free and untrammeled conduct when appearing at trial or on the witness stand.'")
(quoting A.B.A. CANONs OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs 39 (1969)); State v. DeWitt, 286
N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980); Sheriff, Humboldt
County v. Acuna, 819 P.2d 197, 201 (Nev. 1991) ("The testimony condemned by the
courts generally, and now this court in particular, is that which must be played according to
a predetermined script and irrespective of its truthfulness."); People v. Medina, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 145 (Cal. App. 1974) ("[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's
case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed,
either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular
fashion."). But see People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 700 (Cal. 1983) (holding Medina rule
not applicable where agreement simply bound cooperator to testify truthfully), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 892 (1984).
112 One standard agreement provides: "[l]t is understood that the Office's
determination of whether [the cooperator] has cooperated fully and provided substantial
assistance, and the Office's assessment of the value, truthfulness, completeness and accuracy
of the cooperation, shall be binding upon [him]." United States v. Gotti, No. CR 90-1015
(E.D.N.Y.), Tr. 4490 (War. 5, 1992) (testimony of Salvatore Gravano); see also United
States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992); Hughes, supra note 14, at 38 n.143.
113 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; see Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105
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will typically reserve to itself complete discretion over whether or not it will
file such a motion.' 14 If the government determines that a cooperator has not
lived up to his obligations, it will thus generally be able to prevent the
sentencing judge from showing the defendant any significant leniency based on
his cooperation. 115
(1994) (criticizing extent of discretion allowed to prosecutors by § 5K1.1).
An amendment proposed by the American Bar Association's guidelines committee that
would have allowed a court to depart for "substantial assistance" even in the absence of a
motion from the government, see Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Sentencing
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 90,112 (1992), was "[c]onspicuously missing" from the package
of amendments sent to Congress by the Sentencing Commission during the summer of
1993. 53 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1136 (May 12, 1993); see Lee, supra at 145-49 (discussing
failed amendment attempt). The 1994 Crime Bill has given courts some new lattitude in this
area, but not much. See supra note 72.
114 See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 11 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824-25 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Knights, 968
F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Urbani, 967 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir.
1992); Letter Agreement at 9(d) (July 3, 1991), United States v. Wright, No. CR 91-376
(D.D.C.) (copy of Letter Agreement on file with author) ("Your client understands that the
determination of whether he has provided 'substantial assistance' is within the sole discretion
of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and is not reviewable by the
Court."); see also Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial
Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing the Good Faith Standard, 78
MiNN. L. REV. 1253, 1275 (1994). In United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994), the court noted that the plea agreement was
"unusual for its lack of language giving the government the unfettered discretion to
determine whether it would submit a § 5K1.1 motion in the defendant's behalf." Id. at 552
n.3. But see United States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding to
determine whether agreement stating that government "may" make motion if defendant
rendered substantial assistance was intended to leave government with "unbridled
discretion"); United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1992) (agreement
provides that if defendant "makes a good-faith effort prior to his sentencing to provide
substantial assistance... the United States will" make substantial assistance motion at
sentencing).
In state jurisdictions, the prosecution can create a similar enforcement mechanism
through agreements that offer a defendant the chance to plead to a lesser charge, with a
favorable sentencing recommendation, so long as the prosecution "in [its] ... sole
discretion" deems his cooperation satisfactory. People v. Tobler, 397 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (emphasis omitted).
115 See United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 695 (3d Cir. 1990). Even where the absence of a § 5K1.1
motion bars the sentencing judge from departing below the presumptive guideline range on
the ground of a defendant's cooperation, she may still take that cooperation into account
when setting a sentence within that range. See, e.g., United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d
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Where an agreement allows the government this discretion, there are still
limits on a prosecutor's ability to deprive a deserving cooperator of his
sentencing discount, but they are scant. As would be true even in the absence
of any agreement, the government's refusal to file a section 5Kl.1116 or section
3553(e)117 motion cannot be based on unconstitutional considerations, such as
race or religion.' 18 Finding a contractual obligation created by the existence of
a cooperation agreement, some courts have also bound the government to act in
"good faith." 119 This requirement is not entirely without teeth, 120 but it leaves
1010, 1013 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873 (1990); United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990). A judge may also depart below the range if she finds
that the defendant's cooperation has aided the judicial system by breaking a "log jam" in a
mulidefendant case. See United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1991)
(allowing departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0).
1 16 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
117 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
118 Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992); see United States v.
Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219-20 (3d Cir. 1993) (government's refusal to file § 5K1.1
motion cannot constitutionally be based on fact that defendant exercised his right to trial),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994); David Fisher, Comment, Fifth Amendment-
Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute: Constitutional irmts on Decision Not to File
Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 770-71 (1993)
(criticizing Wade for failing to give lower courts sufficient guidance).
119 See United States v. Kelly, 18 F.3d 612, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1994) (if the
government reserves discretion to make substantial assistance motion, relief is available only
upon a showing "that the government's refusal... was based on an unconstitutional
motive, that the refusal was irrational, or that the motion was withheld in bad faith.");
United States v. Profeta, No. 91-3224 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1993) (upholding district court's
finding of no bad faith; no suggestion that district court's inquiry was inappropriate); United
States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1569 (10th Cir. 1992) ("'When a plea agreement leaves
discretion to the prosecutor, the court's role is limited to deciding whether the prosecutor
has made its determination in good faith.'") (quoting United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d
1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1855 (1993); United States v.
Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485, 1488 (2d Cir. 1992) (ordering hearing to determine whether
government acted in "bad faith" when it refused to file § 5K1.1 motion, even though
cooperation agreement left government with "sole and unfettered discretion" to determine
whether defendant had rendered substantial assistance); see also Gyurci, supra note 114
(arguing for objective good faith standard).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Yee-Chau, 17 F.3d 21, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
no bad faith in government's repudiation of agreement after cooperator balked while
testifying); United States v. Ganz, 806 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (applying contract
principles and finds that government acted in bad faith by refusing to make a § 5K1.1
motion after defendant complied fully with the terms of the plea agreement; granting the
sentence reduction called for in the agreement); cf United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228
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the government considerable room to rationalize a dubious, or even a bad faith,
refusal to file.121 In any event, only a minority of circuits has recognized this
obligation. 122
Even when the government finds itself bound to file a motion permitting a
defendant to receive leniency as a cooperator, it can still make clear to the
sentencing judge that the defendant does not deserve much of a discount. 12
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding defendant entitled to specific performance of government's promise
to move for § 5KI.1 departure where government conceded that defendant had already
rendered substantial assistance in investigation of crimes; prosecutor admitted having
withheld § 5KlI. motion to maintain pressure on the defendant when he testified at an
upcoming trial).
121 See Gyruci, supra note 114, at 1276-77 (noting that those courts reviewing
prosecution refusal for bad faith employ subjective standard that prevents "meaningful
review").
The discretionary control the government maintains over § 5K1.1 departures makes it
the rare cooperator who takes a confrontational attitude toward his prosecutors. In United
States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), a defendant implicated in a scheme to
violate the rules governing the auction of Treasury securities disputed the government's
interpretation of certain provisions in his cooperation agreement before entering his plea.
The government thereafter claimed that he had repudiated his agreement. Rejecting the
government's claims and ordering specific performance of the agreement, the district court
noted:
Ordinarily, defendants who have cooperation agreements with the Government are
submissive; they cannot afford to alienate the prosecutor because the sentencing court's
ability to depart from a mandatory minimum sentence or a Sentencing Guideline
depends on the Government's willingness to make a motion for departure under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) or § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines. This defendant, for whatever reason,
was apparently worrying less about pleasing the prosecutor and more about protecting
his flank from exposure to fuither prosecution by the Antitrust Division and potential
civil liabilities.
Id. at 213-14.
12 2 See United States v. Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir.) (holding that plea
agreement leaving government with "sole discretion" to seek § 5Kl.1 departure creates "no
enforceable obligation"; relief only if defendant can show unconstitutional motivation), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 281 (1994); United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1495, 1501-02 (lth Cir. 1993) (holding that
where agreement gives government sole discretion to determine whether defendant gave
"substantial assistance" within meaning of § 5Kl.1, court will not review decision for
arbitrariness or bad faith; will consider only claims of unconstitutional motivation); United
States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 95 (1994); United
States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 984-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 357 (1992).
123 After the defendant had cooperated in United States v. Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131 (7th
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Given the likelihood that the court will defer to the government's assessment of
such a factual issue, a defendant's successful effort to compel a government
motion may be pyrrhic. 124 This deference gives the government substantial de
facto control over the extent of leniency even where judges have the power to
grant sentencing reductions on their own.
It can thus be seen how different a typical agreement to cooperate is from
the classic executory contract of those who simply plead guilty. Both kinds of
agreements rely on the sentencing judge's receptivity to signals from the
Cir. 1993), pursuant to an agreement in which the government promised to recommend a
25% § 5KI.1 departure, defendant's new counsel suggested that defendant's guilty plea may
have been coerced. Thereafter, the government made the agreed-upon recommendation at
sentencing, but noted that a larger departure was unwarranted because the defendant's
cooperation had been of limited value. The sentencing judge refused to depart at all,
questioning whether defendant's cooperation had been substantial enough. Id. at 133-34;
see also United States v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 980 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1992) (Although an
agent testifying at a sentencing hearing urged that defendant should receive downward
departure because of her cooperation, he noted: "I believe that she had more to offer to the
Government, and that her cooperation in this particular case was good, but she was able to
contribute more if she wished to due to her involvement in the trafficking of narcotics and
with the people that she was involved while trafficking in drugs." The defendant
unsuccessfully appealed the extent of the district court's departure.); cf. United States v.
Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455-56 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that where government did
not specifically commit to making sentencing recommendation "enthusiastically," not
obliged to do so). But see United States v. Fisch, 863 F.2d 690, 690 (9th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (holding that prosecutor's bare statement that defendant had cooperated did not
fulfill obligation to inform sentencing judge of all cooperation; more details were needed).
124 The commentary to § 5K1.1 notes that "substantial weight should be given to the
government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the
extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain." U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, cmt. n.3;
see United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529-31 (7th Cir.) (vacating sentence where
district court rejected government's recommendation of six-year sentence and departed
downward to give defendant probation, based not merely on her cooperation but on her
family responsibilities), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991). In United States v. Watson,
988 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994), although it held that the
government was obliged by its agreement to file a § 5K1.1 motion, the court noted that the
government "remain[ed] free to inform the district court of the extent and usefulness of the
defendant's cooperation.... Moreover, the district court may or may not conclude that the
defendant's cooperation warrants a downward departure from the defendant's guideline
range." Id. at 553 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155,
161-62 (3d Cir. 1992).
A district court has complete discretion as to how much of a downward departure a
defendant should receive, and its decision will not be reviewed on appeal. See United States
v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 980 F.2d
13, 15 (1st Cir. 1992).
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
government; 125 if such reliance is ill-founded, the agreements can be
meaningless. 126 But the typical cooperation agreement seems far more like the
"relational contracts" that develop, according to Goetz and Scott, when
"parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-
defined obligations. Such definitive obligations may be impractical because of
inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to
characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies
themselves can be identified in advance." 127 With cooperation agreements, the
absence of precise performance standards may be better attributed to
government's desire to hold a "hammer" over the defendant, and the
impropriety or unseemliness of a contract for specified testimony128 than to the
125 See United States v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir. 1994) (reversing sentence
where district court judge may have accepted government's limited departure
recommendation without exercising his independent judgment and discretion); United States
v. Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 252-53 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding sentence where district court
judge rejected government recommendation of ten-level downward departure because "he
disagreed with the presentence report's recommendation concerning the defendant's
truthfulness and the risk of danger presented by his cooperation"); United States v.
Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Put bluntly, while a government motion is
a necessary precondition to a downward departure based on a defendant's substantial
assistance, the docketing of such a motion does not bind a sentencing court to abdicate its
responsibility, stifle its independent judgment, or comply blindly with the prosecutor's
wishes."); see also Stanley Marcus, Substantial Assistance Motions: Wat Is Really
Happening?, 6 F D. SENTNrrqG REP. 6-8 (1993) (district court judge suggests that no
consistent policy appears to underly government sentencing recommendations in substantial
assistance cases); Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial
Assistance Depanrures in Combatting Ultra-Unifonnity, 35 B.C. L. REv. 799, 832-35
(1994) (highlighting discretion of sentencing judge); Gyruci, supra note 114, at 1261-62
n.44.
Although the possibility that a sentencing judge will dash the expectations of both
parties should never be underestimated, it introduces an element of uncertainty into both
plea agreements and cooperation agreements. The focus here is on the government's
performance only.
126 Even though a judge's hands will not be bound at sentencing, she may have a
reputation as a lenient or harsh sentencer. To the extent that parties have some control over
who will be the sentencing judge, these reputations may play a part in cooperation
negotiations. See STEWART, supra note 99, at 304 (defense lawyer seeks assurance from
government that defendant could plead and be sentenced by a "lenient sentencing judge").
In a number of federal districts, assignment systems that permit such "judge shopping" have
been replaced by random selection. DAViD WEISBUND ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE
CLASSES 110 & n.14 (1991).
12 7 Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 1091.
128 See supra note 111.
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unforeseeability of future conditions. 129 But the response of the contracting
parties is the same: an open-ended covenant in which undefined truthful
cooperation is traded for the government's help in obtaining undefined-or,
where there has been charge bargaining, partially definedl 30-sentencing
leniency.
Goetz and Scott note that:
In contracts containing such vague performance obligations, there are
inevitable costs in ensuring that any particular level of performance is
achieved. Parties will bear this cost in various ways. For example, they may
grant the principal the right to monitor the agent's efforts. Performance can
thus be controlled by direct supervision or by indirect incentive systems
designed to encourage the agent to consider fully the principal's interests.
Alternatively, in cases where monitoring is relatively costly, the agent may
seek to reassure the principal with a "bonding" agreement. Liquidated damage
provisions, covenants not to compete, and unilateral termination clauses are
common examples of agent bonding. 131
Cooperation agreements do contain such monitoring and bonding provisions,
but most are for the government's benefit. Certainly, the cooperator will be
directly supervised; the government will debrief him, prepare his testimony,
and watch him testify. The prospect of a sentence largely dependent on the
government's signals will be a powerful "direct incentive system." 132 And the
129 Flexibility in the face of future contingencies may play a part, however, especially
where a cooperator has promised to "make cases" against specified or unspecified targets.
130 See supra text accompanying note 103.
131 Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 1093.
132 The government may be able to offer additional incentives as well. The cooperator
whose criminal activities expose him to liability in several jurisdictions (state or federal) will
often not seek protection from prosecution fiom officials in each jurisdiction, perhaps for
fear that each office might extract its own concession from him-in the form of testimony,
pleas to charges, etc. He will typically enter into an agreement that formally binds only one
prosecuting authority, even where cooperation given pursuant to the agreement may reveal
criminal acts committed in other districts. See United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 520 (7th
Cir. 1994) ("state prosecutors cannot bind federal prosecutors without the latter's
knowledge and consent"); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1080-82 (6th Cir. 1993)
(circumstances of defendant's plea agreement with one U.S. Attorney do not indicate any
intention of parties to bind other federal districts), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994);
United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1992) (plea agreement with one U.S.
Attorney's Office does not preclude prosecution in another district), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1616 (1993); United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 225-26 (6th Cir. 1991); Staten v.
Neal, 880 F.2d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1989) (plea agreement with state's attorney from one
county not binding on state's attorney for another county); United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d
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government's minimally constrained power to refuse to certify at sentencing
that the defendant has rendered "substantial assistance" can be likened to a
termination clause, adding a final sanction to an already impressive array of
guarantees.
How can a defendant guarantee that the government will reward his
cooperation if he performs his part of the bargain?133 In one sense, a
cooperator holds hostage whatever government proceedings he participates in.
If, while cooperating, he surmises that the government intends to renege, he
can refuse to testify at a trial where his testimony is needed, his memory can
"fail," or he can otherwise affect the content of his testimony. The
government's ability to affect the cooperator's sentencing or to bring additional
charges against him, however, make such tactics-or threats of them-
unsatisfactory enforcement measures. Nor will a cooperation agreement likely
give the defendant a satisfactory "bonding" provision; if the government
624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986) (plea agreement need not expressly recite that it binds other federal
districts, but that promise must be implied by negotiations); United States v. Annabi, 771
F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States
Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the
agreement contemplates a broader restriction."). But see United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d
294, 302-03 (4th Cir. 1986) (promise by federal prosecutor to bring no further charges
binding on all federal districts). For protection against prosecution by these other districts,
he will rely on the good offices of the jurisdiction with which he did contract and will have
a special need to keep his prosecutor satisfied, in hopes that the prosecutor will informally
intercede with other districts if necessary. Cf. United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 741
(11th Cir. 1993) (A prosecutor in one federal district asserted that he intentionally did not
want to give a cooperative defendant immunity against prosecution by other districts
because he believed that the defendant "would be more cooperative if under the threat of
other prosecutions."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 56 (1994).
One drug defendant entered into cooperation agreements with three federal districts
and was sentenced in the Eastern District of Virginia. Thereafter, prosecutors in the Eastern
District of Michigan, not a party to these agreements and therefore claiming not to be bound
by them, instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the defendant and said that a criminal
indictment was imminent. Even as defense lawyers claimed that the Michigan prosecutors
were legally barred from proceeding, Virginia prosecutors noted that they were willing to
"go to bat" for the defendant and the Justice Department said that it was reviewing the case.
Eva Rodriguez, Is One Prosecutor's Grant of Immunity Binding on Another?: Defendant
Who Made a Deal with the Feds Now Says She Was Double-Crossed, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov.
22, 1993, at 1, 6.
133 Although a defendant must face the possibility that the government will refuse in
bad faith to reward his cooperation, it should also be noted that prosecutors have been
known to certify "substantial assistance" where none was given, simply to allow a
sympathetic defendant to avoid a harsh Guidelines sentence. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra
note 109, at 531; Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 107, at 270-71.
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improperly seeks to prevent him from being "paid" for his cooperation,
sentencing judges may be unable to show him the leniency he otherwise would
have received.
So what protection does the snitch have? The answer lies in the discipline
of the marketplace: The prosecutor who mistreats snitches risks not being able
to attract such assets in the future. 134 Here is where the repeat player status of
defense lawyers is critical, for while aggrieved cooperators generally go
directly to prison,135 their attorneys remain to advise future defendants that the
government-or an individual prosecutor-cannot be trusted. 136 This advice
need not be limited to an attorney's future clients. One lawyer recently took out
a large advertisement in a national legal publication to castigate a United States
Attorney in an open letter that, after describing his client's extensive
cooperation, announced:
Despite this, your office broke two written promises to make a 5K1
motion. The reasons given by your office were pure bovine do-do. Even the
district judge was appalled.
During the sentence proceedings I stated that I was going to tell every
defense lawyer in our nation not to enter any plea agreement with your office.
Your office cannot be trusted. Your office cares nothing about promises and
134 In upholding U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988) against
constitutional challenges, several courts noted the government's institutional incentive for
dealing fairly with cooperators. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 358 (D.C.
Cir.) ("The government's strong institutional interest in ensuring the continued assistance of
future defendants affords protection against prosecutorial parsimony in applying section
5K1.1."), cert. denred, 112 S. Ct. 268 (1991); United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010,
1016 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[A] government which is overly grudging in moving for departures
to reward valuable cooperation will likely discover a drying up of its sources of
information."); United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The reasonable
use of substantial assistance motions for those who cooperate will make others more likely
to do so in the future."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); see also United States v.
Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1502 n.4 (11th Cir. 1993) (using same argument in course of holding
that even where there is a plea agreement, government's failure to file § 5K1.1 motion will
not be reviewed for bad faith).
135 Perhaps there are networks of criminals that pool information, but there are no
significant networks of snitches-certainly no such networks that can educate potential
cooperators. And the imprisoned snitch is not likely to bemoan his plight to the general
prison population.
136 Acquiring a reputation within the private bar for untrustworthiness can also affect a
prosecutor's chances for success when he later joins that bar. See JAMES EISENSTEIN,
COUNsEL FOR THE UNITED STATEs: U.S. AToRNEYs IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
174 (1978) ("Assistants recognize their reputation's significance for their prospects in
private practice and they shape their behavior accordingly.").
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agreements. I am surprised that the eagle in the Great Seal of the United States
didn't fly from the wall in horror.
... Regardless of how the Eleventh Circuit rules, I wish to reiterate my
intention to alert every criminal defense lawyer in this nation that your office
should not be trusted. Like some sleazy insurance company who refuses to pay
the widow because it wants the premiums but doesn't want to honor its
obligations, your office will go to any length to renege on its solemn
promises. 137
Although information pooling usually is done less publicly, it can significantly
constrain the government's behavior, 138 even as to clients of lawyers who do
not pool, 139 because the government will not likely know enough to
discriminate among defendants on this basis.
There are many issues relating to a defendant's cooperation decision on
which his lawyer's knowledge and experience can shed light: How strong is the
government's case?140 How valuable is the defendant's testimony or
information likely to be to the government? 14 1 What advantages can be gained
137 Michael H. Metzger, Advertisement, NAT'L. L.J, May 24, 1993, at 26 (letter
dated April 20, 1993, from Michael H. Metzger, to Roberto Martinez, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida); see also Advertisement, N.Y. L.I., May 17,
1993, at 5 (same letter). In an obituary filed after his recent suicide, Metzger was described
as "one of Northern California's most aggressive and outspoken defense lawyers." Michael
Metzger, 57, Hard-Hiting Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994, at D22. The case that
sparked Metzger's remonstrance, United States v. Block, No. 92-115-CR-Kehoe (S.D.
Fla.), is still on appeal, and I have no idea whether his complaints have any merit.
138 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the L'mits
ofLegal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 142 (1974) (Establishing a clearinghouse that
allows one-shot players to share information "gives [opposing repeat players] a stake in the
effect that [one shots] could have on their reputation.").
In a federal district where the defense bar felt aggrieved by some prosecutors' refusals
to submit § 5K1.1 motions, the government was forced to rely much more heavily on
charge reductions, thus giving defendants more of a reward "up front" for their
cooperation. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 109, at 541.
139 Alschuler notes that "[miost private defense lawyers are solo practitioners or
members of small firms with little opportunity and sometimes little inclination to share
'trade secrets.'" Alschuler, supra note 25, at 1230.
140 Estimating the strength of the government's case may be particularly difficult for
the lawyer whose client seeks advice about cooperation because such decisions often need to
be made before the government's discovery materials are available. See Restrespo, supra
note 92, at 24. The task will be much easier in less sophisticated prosecutions, where the
strength of the government's case is clear from the outset.
141 See Cloyd, supra note 105, at 459 (describing how an attorney, understanding
government's needs, can maximize value of information client proffers to government).
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by joining with co-defendants to present a united front to the government?' 42
What sentence will likely be imposed should the defendant simply plead guilty
or stand trial? The lawyer can also use her negotiating expertise to obtain the
best offer from the government. 143 But for the defendant contemplating
cooperation, an assessment of the extent to which the government can be
trusted will perhaps be the most important contribution the attorney can make.
Without this information, the decision to cooperate-whatever its potential
advantages' 44-will remain a risky leap into the unknown.
III. PRESSURES ON DEFENSE ATrORNEYS TO DETER COOPERATION
We have seen how a defense attorney's advice, particularly on the extent to
which the government should be trusted, can and should play a decisive role in
the calculus of the defendant contemplating cooperation. By assuring and
helping to ensure that the government will perform on its promise of leniency,
she can make cooperation a far more attractive option. Alternatively, she can
make the rewards of cooperation seem quite illusory. Ideally, her advice will
turn on the facts and circumstances of each case, with her client's best interests
142 The defendant may also need to know the likelihood that his co-defendants will
cooperate against him, an assessment of which may in part turn on the reputations of their
lawyers. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
143 One prominent white-collar defense lawyer warns:
A lawyer representing a cooperator must be especially vigilent to protect his
interests. The lawyer needs to be careful that firm limits are set on what is expected of
the client by the government.... Lawyers also have to fight for what their client
deserves. No one has much sympathy for a cooperator, so getting the benefits at
sentencing may be hard if the government decides to pressure a client for more
information.
Arkin, supra note 42, at 9.
144 These advantages, in addition to sentencing discounts, may include promises of
future support or protection. See Witness Protection Progra: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 356-59, 362-63 (1978) (collecting complaints by several protected witnesses about
promises made before their testimony but later broken); Stuart Mass, Note, The Dilena of
the Intimidated Witness in Federal Organized Crime Prosecutions: Owosing Among the
Fear of Reprisals, the Contempt Powers of the Court, and the Witness Protection Program,
50 FORD. L. REV. 582, 587-88 (1982) (discussing grievances against Witness Protection
Program). Information about the extent to which he can be protected against retaliation can
further reduce the uncertainty a defendant faces concerning the effective payout for
cooperation.
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as her sole guide.
But can we have confidence that the lawyer's advice will be untainted by
her own ideological or economic interests? The prevailing pathologies of the
criminal justice system suggest that defense attorneys, whether retained or
appointed, have strong incentives to push clients into plea bargains, with little
thought to the clients' interests. It stands to reason that the same attorney who
manipulates her clients into pleading guilty because she lacks the ability or
inclination to defend their interests zealously would give little thought to
advising a defendant to make the surrender complete by cooperating. 145
However, what of the lawyer who has not fallen victim to the widely noted
conflicts of interests that dampen adversarial representation? What likelihood is
there that her advice about cooperation will be uninfected by personal interest?
Herein lies a paradox. For many of the same motivations that ordinarily lead an
attorney to do the best she can for an individual client may, at the same time,
create a different sort of agency problem, leading her to give advice skewed
against cooperation, regardless of her client's interests.
A. From Where Comes an Advocate's Motivation?
Most criminal defendants are represented by appointed counsel whom they
neither select nor pay.146 Where counsel has been appointed from the private
bar, she will be paid-if paid at all-either a flat fee' 47 or, as in the federal
system, a fee based on an hourly compensation rate. 148 Alternatively,
145 See Cloyd, supra note 105, at 463-64 (discussing "significant emotional pressure"
placed on defendant when "the member of court who is supposed to be most supportive of
the defendant's interests throws his weight in support of the state's definition of the
situation" by urging that cooperation is defendant's only way to escape long prison term and
felony conviction).
146 Andy Court, Poor Man's Justice: Is There a Cisis, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at
46 (approximately 80% of all felony defendants are indigent).
14 7 See Andy Court, Rush to Justice, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 57 (describing
Detroit Recorder's Court indigent representation scheme in which court-appointed counsel
paid set fee based on seriousness of charge, regardless of time spent on case); D.M.
Osborne, Contracting for Trouble, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 75 (describing Harlan
County, Kentucky system in which contracts given to lawyers to take on all indigent cases
in district, regardless of volume, in exchange for set fee).
148 See Report of the Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act, 52 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2265, 2275 (Ian. 29, 1993) (attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants
under Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, currently paid $40 for out-of-court
time, and $60 for in-court time-rates found to be "significantly below those otherwise
available to private attorneys and... insufficient in many districts to cover even basic
overhead costs"). Schulhofer notes:
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appointed counsel will come from the ranks of a public defender agency or like
organization, whose attorneys are salaried employees. If a defendant is able to
retain his own lawyer, she will likely charge him a flat fee, to be paid in
advance, 149 which will not be refunded if she pushes him into a quick plea.150
In short, few defense attorneys have an immediate financial incentive to
represent a particular client zealously. To make matters worse, few defendants
will have the knowledge or wherewithal to monitor their lawyers'
performance, 151 and monitoring by appointing authorities can be inadequate.15 2
[FIlat fees per case are a common method of compensation [for state indigent
representation systems], so that incentives to settle are powerful. Where hourly rates
exist, nearly all states impose a ceiling on total compensation that is independent of the
plea tendered. For the appointed attorney who chooses to go to trial, the financial
compensation in many states is totally derisory.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43, 55 (1988) (footnote omitted).
149 AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EXPLORING THE LABRYINTH OF FEE SETTING, How
TO SET AND COLLECt ATrORNEY FEES IN CRnNAL CAsES 13, 14 (1985) [hereinafter
ExPLoIUNG THE LABRYINTH OF FEE SETTING]; BLUMBERG, supra note 44, at 244; Pamela S.
Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 599 (1993) ("The
prevailing fee arrangements in criminal defense representation today involve either entirely
prepaid fees... or the payment up front of a substantial retainer against which the
attorney's hourly rate will be offset, often with an agreement for the prepayment of further
lump sums if the retainer is exhausted."); Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Oiminal
Contingent Fee, 82 3. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 514 (1991); Schulhofer, supra note
17, at 1988 ("Only a minority of criminal defense attorneys (as few as twenty percent in
many urban jurisdictions) are retained by paying clients, and nearly all of those attorneys
work for a flat fee paid in advance.").
150 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing that a flat fee encourages quick disposition); Alschuler, supra note 25, at 1200
(suggesting that once fee is collected, personal interest of attorney lies in disposing of case
as quickly as possible); Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) ("Defendants' lawyers, who have a conflict of interest if
working for a fixed fee, may use plea bargaining to hide sloth or even fraud.").
151 BLUMBERG, supra note 44, at 244-45 (describing ability of defense lawyers to
"con" defendants into accepting plea bargains, and readiness of courts and prosecutors to
cooperate with defense lawyers in this "confidence game"); Schulhofer, supra note 17, at
1991 ("On the defense side, the attorney-client relationship is not the voluntary contractual
arrangement postulated by economic theory, but a partly or wholly involuntary relationship
infected by pervasive conflicts of interest and the virtual nonexistence of effective means to
monitor counsel's loyalty and performance in the low-visibility plea negotiation setting.");
Schulhofer, supra note 148, at 59 ("[flew defendants are in a position to appraise the
preparation and tactics of their counsel").152 See Report of the Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act, supra note 148, at
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Add to these obstacles the belief by criminal lawyers that the vast majority of
their clients are in fact guilty of some wrongdoing, 53 and it seems that you
have a recipe for disaster.
Why is it, then, that lawyers do not routinely sell out their clients? As
Charles Ogletree has recently noted, this is a question less of theoretical
"justifications" than of actual "motivations. " 154 For many lawyers, a sense of
professional duty, inspired by a client's trust and strengthened by the
obligations of the code of ethics, might provide sufficient sustenance. 155 This
might merely be a matter of personal pride. Yet some may find this
professional commitment to a client's interests confirmed or enhanced by what
Ogletree calls "empathy," a readiness to "see[] the client as more than a
criminal defendant" and to "understand[] the adverse conditions he endures and
the bleak future he may well face." 15 6 For the lawyer driven by such client-
2283 (noting failure of most federal districts to monitor activities of counsel appointed under
Criminal Justice Act); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent
Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Conswner Sovereignty and Freedom
of Choicefor All Oiminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 95 (1993) ("Judges and
court officials who select counsel have the ability to acquire good information about
attorney effectiveness, but they have little incentive to acquire such information and even
less reason to act upon it. Their own interests are best served by assigning an attorney
known to be cooperative rather than aggressively adversarial.").
153 Charles j. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justfications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1269 n.121 (1993) ("While it is difficult to
determine how many defendants are guilty, there is evidence that public defenders and
criminal defense lawyers themselves believe that the vast majority of their clients are guilty
of some wrongdoing."); see David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MIcH. L.
REV. 1729, 1757 (1993) ("Along with... [the] low pay scale [for court-appointed counsel]
goes the natural human tendency to cut corners, especially when doing unpleasant things on
behalf of unappetizing strangers whom one will probably never see again.").
154 Ogletree, supra note 153, at 1242.
155 See supra note 23; Ogletree, supra note 153, at 1246-47; cf. State v. Rush, 217
A.2d 441, 444 (1966) (no need to pay court-appointed attorneys more because a "lawyer
needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his pride"); Grayson v. State, 479 So. 2d
69, 73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (same), aft'd, 479 So.2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
865 (1985).
156 Ogletree, supra note 153, at 1243; see Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender,
in PHiLp HEYMANN & LANCE LmBMAN, THE SOCIAL REsPONSIBIImIES OF LAWYERS 69, 79
(1988) ("To represent a client properly, you have to be able to develop an enormous
amount of empathy."); LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACnICE OF LAW
IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE 143 (1987) ("[E]mpathy with the client's situation permits
lawyers to feel justified when defending someone whom they know is factually guilty.").
Related to these feelings of "empathy" is what Barbara Babcock has called the "social
worker's reason" for criminal defense work: "Those accused of crime, as the most visible
[Vol. 56:69
COOPERATING CLIEN7S
centered motivations, Lord Brougham's rhetorical flourish might indeed be a
living truth: "[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duties, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client."157
The lawyer for whom such client-centered motivations are not enough can
still be spectacularly zealous. She might be driven by a sense of what Ogletree
calls "heroism," "a desire to take on 'the system' and prevail, even in the face
of overwhelming odds."' 58 Ogletree has the public defender in mind when he
speaks of the "glory in the 'David versus Goliath' challenge of fighting the
state," 15 9 but the lawyer defending a corporate executive against the lawyers
and agents of the SEC, IRS and the Justice Department can feel equally
outgunned and see "glory" in her job as well. She can also see herself as
"fighting for all of us," because the ideology of criminal advocacy allows her
to view her client, whatever his misdeeds, as a surrogate for the more
"worthy" people who would ultimately suffer if she did not work to keep the
government in check. 160 The lawyers who adopt this stance may share a special
esprit that itself inspires zeal. The interests of particular clients differ, but a
commitment to opposing state power is a banner around which many may
rally.
Even the defense attorney, unmoved by professional or ideological
commitment, who places economic self-interest above all else, may still have
good reason to do her utmost for her client so long as she seeks to participate
in a market for legal services populated by "buyers" with some knowledge of
her past performances. In the absence of adequate monitoring by the public
authorities responsible for their appointments, lawyers for the indigent-who
rely on court appointment-may have little economic incentive to be zealous
representatives of the disadvantaged underclass in America, will actually be helped by
having a defender, notwithstanding the outcome of their cases. Being treated as a real
person in our society... and accorded the full panoply of rights and measure of concern
afforded by a lawyer can promote rehabilitation." "To this," Babcock adds, "might be
added the humanitarian's reason: the criminally accused are men and woman in great need,
and it is part of one's duty to one's fellow creatures to come to their aid." Barbara A.
Babcock, Commentary, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175, 178 (1983-84).
157 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Cient
Relation, 85 YALE L.. 1060, 1060 (1976) (quoting from Lord Brougham's speech at the
trial of Queen Caroline, in 1821).
158 Ogletree, supra note 153, at 1243.
159 Id. at 1276.
160 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND IUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-63 (1988). But see
Luban, supra note 153, at 1765 (conceding that arguments justifying aggressive defense
tactics may not fully extend to "the high-priced hired guns"); William H. Simon, The Ethics
of Crirnal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (challenging Luban's vision of the
ideology supporting aggressive criminal defense tactics).
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advocates, and the lawyer who earns her living by representing paying clients
who lack opportunities to learn about her past performances will-if purely
venal-worry less about the quality of her advocacy than about advertising her
name. 161 But the lawyer seeking future business162 from the educated
customers who typically populate the higher end of the market-better-off
clients and the lawyers on whom those clients rely for referrals-will have a
powerful incentive163 to ensure that positive information about her
performances is available in this market. 164
B. Effects of Motivation on Attitudes Toward Cooperation
To the extent that a lawyer is driven by a sense of professionalism or some
other commitment to the individualized interests of her client, she will feel no
personal stake in whether her client chooses to cooperate-at least so long as no
other client's interest would be threatened by cooperation. 165 Although the
161 For a graphic discussion of the way members of the "cop out bar" find their
clients, see Alschuler, supra note 25, at 1182-91; see also Schulhofer, supra note 148, at 59
(noting few defendants in a position to "acquire reliable comparative reports about the plea-
negotiation skills of various attorneys").
162 Because most attorneys in public defender organizations stay for relatively brief
terms, see MCINTYRE, supra note 156, at 80-83, such lawyers may have an economic
incentive to develop reputations on which they can "cash in" later, when they enter private
practice.
163 The market does not have to be composed exclusively of such buyers for them to
create this incentive. See Easterbrook, supra note 150, at 309 ("Particular defendants may
lack the information necessary to search intelligently, but in legal markets as in others
search by even a few buyers may be sufficient for efficiency.").
164 Paul B. Wice, Private Oiminal Lanyers: A Beleaguered but Crucial Profession, in
EXPLORING THE LABRYINTH OF FEE SETING, supra note 149, at 29, 31; see Paul D.
Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1291, 1292 ("[C]lients who
select and compensate their lawyers generally retain enough control to assure that matters
are handled satisfactorily. At least this is true for those clients who are part of the return
trade, or who are likely to share their reactions with other prospective clients.").
No discussion of defender motivations that are not client-centered could be complete
without mention of "egotism," see EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNrr
WILL iAS: ULTMATE INSIDER: LEGENDARY TRIAL LAwYER 121 (1991); Babcock, supra
note 156, at 178, but the focus here is only on those motivations likely to systematically bias
an attorney's advice about cooperation.
165 The potential for conflicts of interest inherent in the simultaneous representation of
two individuals-formally charged or otherwise-able to incriminate one another has long
been recognized, although the potential benefits of such arrangements, see supra note 75,
have led courts to allow such arrangements where clients make informed waivers. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 44 (establishing waiver procedure); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 776-77
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attorney may have an instinctive distaste for cooperation-as might her client-
she should be quite able to offer an objective assessment of the benefits and
liabilities of this option. 166 The lawyer who looks beyond her client's interests
and finds motivation in ideology or economic self-interest, however, may not
be so neutral, and will have good reason to discourage her clients from
choosing cooperation.
1. Ideological Resistance to Cooperation
Derrick Bell noted that the same "idealism and commitment to school
integration" that "help explain the drive that enables the civil rights lawyer to
survive discouragement and defeat and renew the challenge for change" can
prevent the lawyer from effectively representing parents more interested in the
quality of their children's education than in broader ideals of integration. 167 A
similar clash between the ideology motivating a lawyer's advocacy and the
narrower interests of her clients may also arise in criminal defense work,
especially where clients are contemplating cooperation.
(1987) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when defense counsel's partner represented
co-defendant because no showing that defense counsel ever had to choose between
conflicting interests); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 475 (1978) (holding court's
failure to appoint separate counsel or make further inquiry into potential for conflict, where
defense counsel representing three co-defendants warned of such conflict, violated Sixth
Amendment); United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 320-22 (9th Cir. 1990)
(disqualification of trial counsel where same attorney represented associate of defendant in
pending grand jury investigation); Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108, 1117 (5th Cir. 1988)
(finding no conflict of interest in simultaneous representation of three co-defendants with
consistent defenses); Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476 (6th Cir.) (holding "all or nothing"
plea offer to three defendants represented by the same attorney created conflict of interest as
to each defendant), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); see also John S. Geer,
Representation of Multiple Crinanal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and Professional
Responsibilities of the Deense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978); Gary T. Lowenthal,
Joint Representation in Cininal Cases. A Oitical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REV. 939 (1978);
Nancy I. Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney Representing Multiple Witnesses Before a
Grand Jwy: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1979); Peter W.
Tague, Multiple Representation of Targets and Witnesses During Grand Jury Investigations,
17 AM. CrIM. L. REV. 301 (1980).
166 Every lawyer will doubtless have some personal bias for or against cooperation,
based on some mix of ideology, experience, and the like. Any effect that such biases may
have on the client-centered lawyer's advice, however, would probably be dwarfed by the
effects of biases, like those discussed here, rooted in the very sources of other lawyers' zeal.
167 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALEL.J. 470, 511-12 (1976).
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In Lopez, Barry Tarlow proclaimed snitching morally repugnant. 168 He is
far from the only defense attorney to enunciate this view. 169 Although such
attitudes echo the common disdain for the "snitch," 170 they also reflect-and
are reinforced by-the ideology that sustains some of the most zealous criminal
defense lawyers. The lawyer motivated by a sense of "heroism" understandably
may see nothing heroic about negotiating an alliance between her client and the
government that will allow the government to bring all its resources to bear on
somebody else. 171 A client's cooperation will not merely be distasteful but-in
contrast to a simple guilty plea-can make the attorney an active ally of the
very entity whose power inspires her advocacy. Indeed, the cooperating
defendant's attorney may find herself spending long hours preparing her client
168 See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(quoting an affidavit submitted by Barry Tarlow, Esq.), rev'd., 989 F. 2d 1032 (9th Cir.),
amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); supra note 3.
169 See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1993) (defendant's "revolutionary
lawyers" allegedly opposed his cooperating because they "pursued a confrontational defense
strategy... in furtherance of 'radical political beliefs'"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1088
(1994); Monroe Freedman, The Lawyer Who Hates Snitches, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993,
at 28 (noting that "[mI]any other defense lawyers, and even some prosecutors and judges,
share [Tarlow's]... view").
In his open letter to U.S. Attorney Martinez, supra note 137, Michael Metzger wrote:
I must tell you that it is contrary to my own principles to turn my clients into
snitches. I believe that the present policy of the United States is going to result in a
nation of informants much the same as prevailed under the regimes of Adolph Hitler
and Joseph Stalin. The buying of witnesses with money and freedom destroys the soul
of the defendant, corrupts the adversarial system and is totally un-American. It is not
only un-American, it is a practice that has been hated since the beginning of civilization.
Where, after all, did the condemnation of Judas come from? Or as a famous poet wrote
about Ireland "God help that country where informers thrive, where slander flourishes
and lies can contrive to kill by whispers and men lie to live."
See also DERSHOW1TZ, supra note 27, at 22 (When Dershowitz and his co-counsel learned
that a client had been a police informant, co-counsel announced: "'We have to get out of
the case. I don't work for the government. And I don't represent finks. Let the government
get him a lawyer. He's their boy.'"). I have heard other defense lawyers make similar
comments.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 43-60.
171 Cf. Bell, Jr., supra note 167, at 493 (Noting of civil rights class actions: "The
psychological motivations which influence the lawyer in taking on 'a fiercer dragon'
through the class action may also underlie the tendency to direct the suit toward the goals of
the lawyer rather than the client.").
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to withstand another defense lawyer's cross-examination. 172
The prospect of entering an alliance directed against the interests
championed by a fellow defense attorney may also repel the ideologically
committed defense lawyer who sees the solidarity of the defense bar as a
critical counterbalance to overzealous prosecutors. Lawyers like Tarlow-who
complain that "'[the war on crime has become a war on the defense bar,'"
whose office has been described as "a nerve center for the criminal defense
bar," 173 and who has regularly contributed to The Chwnpion (the magazine of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, an organization on
whose board of directors he has sat)174-have long challenged the
government's monolithic power in debates over criminal justice policy. The
representation of a cooperator not only would require such a lawyer to
forswear ties to the rest of the defense team in the immediate case, but might
also make her feel like a defector from the common cause.
2. Economic Disincentives to Counseling Cooperation
The lawyer whose adversarial zeal is powered by a desire to impress
educated consumers or purchasing agents in the market for legal services may
also be biased against cooperation, not as a matter of personal conviction, but
as a consequence of the interests of those consumers.
We start with two basic premises. First, we can assume, as a general
proposition, that a defendant's decision to cooperate will ultimately become
public, or at least suspected by interested parties. This will not be true if
cooperation entails only undercover activities that never require the defendant
to testify or have his role exposed. If a cooperator does testify, however-as
those who have been formally charged frequently do-his decision will be
public knowledge and the details of his deal with the government will be
explored at length during cross-examination. Even when a case does not end up
going to trial, a cooperator's readiness to testify will often become known
during plea negotiations. Second, we can assume that the risk-averse consumer
who learns that a defendant has cooperated will consider that defendant's
lawyer at least partially responsible for her client's decision. Given the extent
172 See United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
attorney has duty to prepare client to testify; must do more than simply advise client to tell
the truth); Littlejohn v. State, 593 So. 2d 20, 24 (Miss. 1992) (same).
Although many defense lawyers prefer to make themselves scarce while a client is
cooperating, such lack of attention can work to the client's detriment, should the extent of
the client's cooperation be disputed at sentencing.
173 Cox, supra note 3, at 1, 29.
174 See Tarlow, supra note 27, at 40.
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to which many, perhaps most, defendants are likely to rely on their attorneys'
advice before making this leap into the unknown, 175 and the active role that a
cooperator's attorney may be expected to play in promoting the success of her
client's relationship with the government,176 this attribution of responsibility
might indeed be justified. At the very least, it is a fair inference for the risk-
averse consumer who cannot know precisely what was said in attorney-client
conferences. 177
What are the consequences in the market for the lawyer who gets a
reputation as someone who "cooperates" her clients? 178 It depends on which
buyers one is talking about. Among the relatively small group of individual
defendants-or potential defendants-who have the resources to make an
informed search for a defense lawyer, 179 there will doubtless be some already
contemplating cooperation who believe that a lawyer who has previously dealt
with the government on such matters will have an "in" with the prosecutor,
and can thereby get a better deal.' 80 However, unless such a defendant is
prepared to surrender unconditionally to the government, he might be wary of
a lawyer with too much experience cooperating clients, because the selection of
such a lawyer could be taken as a signal that the defendant has already decided
to cooperate and therefore will not need to be given additional concessions. The
extent to which this sort of defendant will prefer a lawyer with a reputation for
175 Because defendants who choose cooperation over their lawyers' objections and
contact the government on their own will often obtain a new lawyer for negotiating a
cooperation agreement, see infra text accompaning note 191, a cooperator's failure to
change lawyers is some indication that his attorney was not hostile to the idea.
176 See supra note 172.
177 Perhaps a consumer aware of a lawyer's "defection" in a previous case might be
"forgiving," focusing on the particular circumstances of the previous case and declining to
draw any broader conclusion from it. Such forbearance is unlikely to continue if the second
lawyer cooperates a second (or third) client in a different case, however.
178 The frequent use of "cooperate" in this active, transitive form is itself evidence of
the control that those in the criminal justice system think a lawyer has over her client's
decision to cooperate.
179 See Karlan, supra note 149, at 608 ("Sophisticated white-collar targets who can
'shop' for counsel are quite differently situated from naive arrestees who must select an
attorney while incarcerated.").
180 The assumption that a lawyer's ability to cooperate clients can bring in business lay
behind the plaintiff's claim in Bourexis v. Carroll County Narcotics Task Force, 625 A.2d
391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 632 A.2d 150 (Md. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1303 (1994), where a defense attorney sued a narcotics enforcement group claiming that its
refusal to "work with" any of his clients "interfered with his occupational opportunities" by
making him less desirable to have as a lawyer. No specific reason was given for the task
force's position, although one officer testified that the policy "was based on ... [a]
perception that... [the lawyer] was an 'asshole.'" Id. at 393-94.
[Vol. 56:69
COOPERATING CLIEN
cooperating with the government is therefore difficult to predict.18'
On the other hand, some individual consumers will carefully avoid lawyers
who either counsel cooperation or view it with equanimity. If a group of
defendants-with or without legal advice-concludes that the solution to their
particular prisoner's dilemma lies in a joint agreement not to cooperate, they
may understandably fear that unenforceable pledges of solidarity will prove
fragile as the pressures of a prosecution mount. If the defendants want a better
guarantee of group cohesion-but do not want to be jointly represented by a
single lawyer-they might well search for separate lawyers who can be counted
on to oppose, or at least not encourage, defection. The lawyer with a reputation
for representing clients who stand fast against the government will be well
positioned to be selected for this joint defense team. Indeed, as Gilson and
Mnookin have shown, selection of a lawyer interested in protecting her
reputation for not defecting can "bond" a defendant's solidarity promise. 182
In sum, the demands of educated individual consumers will be varied.
Some may place a premium on lawyers with a track record of cooperation.
Others may strive to avoid those lawyers. For perhaps an even greater number
of individuals, a lawyer's reputation on this score may not be a factor at all,
whether because the consumer's case presents no cooperation possibilities or
181 Mann reports:
Clients who are told by attorneys that voluntary disclosure would not help their
case or that cooperation with the government would be self-defeating often feel insecure
with their attorney's advice. ... Openly proclaiming innocence is a stance that some
guilty clients do not have the courage for-they prefer an attorney who will help them
plead guilty in favorable circumstances. Though he tries, the defense attorney may fail
in persuading the client that he would be better off by not cooperating.
MANN, supra note 42, at 127 (also detailing how client, after consulting with two different
attorneys, chose the one who said he could "arrange a settlement").
182 Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 564 (1994). Gilson
and Mnookin address the prisoner's dilemma posed by civil litigation in which each side
"may feel compelled to make a contentious move either to exploit, or to avoid exploitation
by, the other side." Id. at 514. They explain:
rIThe lawyer's investment in reputation serves two functions. First, it identifies the
lawyer as one who possesses the desired, but otherwise unobservable, attribute; the
client must be able to find a cooperative lawyer. Second, it represents the penalty that
the market will impose if the lawyer treats his reputation as bait rather than as bond by
turning into a gladiator at the request of an opportunistic client.
Id. at 525.
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because the consumer brings no preferences on the matter to his search. If the
market for criminal defense services were simply comprised of individuals
purchasing representation for themselves, a lawyer's reputation for cooperating
clients thus might have no effect on his livelihood, one way or another.
The market does not consist simply of autonomous individual clients,
however. Some of the most active and sophisticated purchasers of legal defense
services act on behalf of enterprises, formal or informal, that stand to lose, or
even be destroyed, by cooperation. The classic scenarios involve the drug
ring183 or organized crime family i84 that provides "house counsel" 185 to
subordinates, not merely as a perk of membership in the enterprise, but in the
hopes that the lawyers will deter, or at least mitigate the effects of, cooperation
by their clients. 186 More "legitimate" enterprises like corporations or labor
183 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 948-49 (2d Cir.) (evidence
that drug kingpin paid legal fees of crew members and encouraged them to use his lawyer),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919 (1991); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 799 (6th Cir.
1983) (defendant tells agents that he wants to cooperate but fears that his lawyer, who had
been retained by his drug boss, would inform that boss).
In United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237
(1988), one law firm represented petitioner, his co-defendant and boss, and the unindicted
"generals" of their smuggling operation. "Unidentified persons" paid the legal fees for all.
After his initial appearance, petitioner, like the other subordinate members of the operation,
was referred to another lawyer, whose fees were also paid anonymously, but not before a
member of the lead law firm polygraphed petitioner, to ensure that petitioner had not turned
state's evidence. Lead counsel conducted plea negotiations on behalf of all defendants. In
Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1994), the defendent alleged after
conviction that his lawyer, retained by a third party (whom the lawyer would not identify)
had announced to him: "I've never worked, and will not work, for a 'snitch,' am I working
for one now?"
184 See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing how
Mafia family provided and paid lawyers for its members), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646
(1994); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("uncontroverted" testimony suggests that some members of Mafia "crew" "were
paying... [attorney] for legal services performed for other crew members, and were also
choosing attorneys for members who got in trouble").
185 See Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualiy OQiinal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1201, 1227 (1989); Roxanne
Malaspina, Note, Resolving the Conflict of the Unsworn Witness: A Framework for
Disqualifying House Counsel Under the Advocate-Witness Rule, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1073,
1094 (1992) ("A lawyer who acts as house counsel provides legal services to an
organization and its members and generally participates actively and intimately in the
client's business.").
186 As the Supreme Court noted:
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unions 8 7 may have similar interests when they retain or refer lawyers to
represent employees or members.188 The effect that these entities' preferences
will have on the market is particularly great because most are repeat players-
or at least represented by repeat players189-able to steer future business based
Courts and commentators have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a
cnminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party,
particularly when the third party is the operator of the alleged criminal enterprise. One
risk is that the lawyer will prevent his client from obtaining leniency by preventing the
client from offering testimony against his former employer or from taking other actions
contrary to the employer's interest.
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1981). Similarly, Alan Dershowitz has explained:
The bosses have an interest in assuring that their own lawyers-lawyers they are
paying-are representing the mules. The last thing the boss wants is for an independent
lawyer-or worse, a lawyer friendly to prosecutors--to encourage the mules to buy
their freedom in exchange for turning on the boss.... [A] smart boss will generally try
to retain the best possible lawyers for his mules. But he will try to get lawyers who will
urge the mules to 'fight rather than switch' allegiances.
DERSHowrrz, supra note 27, at 398-99.
The boss's interests in avoiding the defection of his subordinates will not depend on his
own intentions in the case. Even if he intends to cooperate, he will want to maximize his
reward by being the first one into the prosecutor's office; this is the lesson of the prisoner's
dilemma. This may mean, however, that a lawyer who represents only bosses can profitably
develop a reputation for dealing with the government. To the extent that bosses are
represented by boss-lawyers (who need not fear developing a reputation for cooperating
clients), this may further skew the inequities of a system in which bosses regularly cooperate
against, and get lower sentences than, subordinates. See supra note 49.
187 See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 463 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (defendant
police officer represented by lawyer retained and paid by Fraternal Order of Police, which
had policy of noncooperation with Special Prosecutor's Office investigating this and other
corruption cases); Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa.) (same Fraternal Order of
Police lawyer barred from representing twelve policemen called before grand jury by same
Special Prosecutor's Office), aff'd on reh'g, 352 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
188 See STEWART, supra note 99, at 314-15 (When considering which lawyers to
recruit to represent potential witnesses in the Milken case, "[m]ore important" than the
"lawyers' skills and reputations... were the lawyers' track records in government cases.
[Edward Bennett] Williams and company wanted lawyers whose strong philosophical
preference was to fight the government rather than cooperate with it.").
189 See, e.g., United States v. Turchi, 645 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (defendant
alleges that this attorney failed to advise him about cooperation because of that attorney's
professional relationship with codefendant's lawyer, for whom petitioner's attorney had
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on a lawyer's performance or, more precisely, her clients' decisions as to
cooperation. 190
There is one repeat player whose favor a lawyer may gain by representing
cooperators-the government. Although prosecutors ordinarily have little
control over a defendant's choice of lawyer, they occasionally make referrals
for defendants or witnesses who have already decided to cooperate-or are at
least seriously considering doing so-and who request assistance in finding a
new attorney. 191 It has been suggested that lawyers appear on such "approved"
been an associate and thereafter did other work), affid, 815 F.2d 697 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 912 (1987); THOMAS, supra note 164, at 318 (recounting how a potential
witness against John Connolly suddenly "clammed up and refused to cooperate" after
Edward Bennett Williams, Connolly's lawyer, arranged for him to be represented by an
"old buddy" who was "renting space in Williams' building and taking many of his cases as
referrals from his landlord."); id. at 408 (The "independent" lawyer whom Williams found
to represent a client's employee, and who would be paid by Williams's client, "was often a
friend of Williams' and dependent on Wlliams for referrals in the future. He felt both
personal and marketplace pressures to do exactly what Williams told him to do.").
One white-collar attorney told Kenneth Mann that, when looking for someone to
represent a potential witness against his client, he "wanted a friend in the case who would
not turn this guy against his client." But he went on to modify this: "The
understanding... among lawyers who have some sophistication and decency is that you do
whatever you have to do for your client but, at the same time, without injuring your client's
interest, you can help your brother who represents someone else, you do that. I do that
anyway." MANN, supra note 42, at 91.
19 0 See United States v. RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915, 923-24 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(acknowledging that a desire for more business from corporation may affect attorney's
advice to employee-clients immunized in grand jury); Tate, supra note 36, at 54 ("The
temptation [for a corporate employee's separate counsel] to respond to corporate counsel
with inappropriate cooperation concerning separate counsel's representation of the
employee might be great because it is unlikely separate counsel will remain on the
corporation's referral list if she was perceived as obstreperous.").
As Lowenthal noted:
If a corporation under government investigation or an organized crime
syndicate retains counsel for an employee-defendant, for example, the lawyer may
accept the case with the hope of obtaining future business from the employer. His
loyalty to the person or entity paying the fee thus may impair his flexibility in
representing the employee in such matters as negotiation with the prosecution,
because cooperation with government investigation or prosecution of the employer
will jeopardize the possibility of future retainers.
Lowenthal, supra note 165, at 963.
191 See, e.g., Boulas v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489 & n.4 (Cal. App.
1986) (police officer attempts to steer defendant seeking to cooperate toward retaining
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lists only if they "can be trusted to encourage their 'clients' to cooperate." 192
Even assuming this to be true, however, the practice provides little economic
incentive because the representation of a defendant who already has essentially
decided to cooperate is not likely to be particularly lucrative-certainly not
compared to the fees paid by private repeat players committed to having cases
either taken to trial or concluded after motion practice and vigorous plea
discussions.
Finally, although the analysis so far has focused only on how client interest
may lead lawyers representing potential targets to ensure that potential
cooperators are represented by "reliable" attorneys, the targets' lawyers may
have immediate economic incentives as well. Especially in white-collar cases,
defense lawyers will frequently enter into joint defense agreements, which
allow them to exchange information about their clients within the defense camp
without jeopardizing the confidentiality of the information. 193 If a defendant
who is party to such an agreement cooperates, the government can claim "that
the remaining joint defense attorneys cannot remain in the case without
violating their ethical duties" to the cooperator. 194 The consequences of such a
defection from the defense camp can thus be disqualification-and loss of as yet
unearned fees19 5-for the remaining lawyers. 196
Only tentative conclusions are possible here without better data. It does
seem, however, that among those sophisticated buyers of criminal defense
services with any preference as to a lawyer's reputation for cooperating clients,
the demand for lawyers who can be counted on to recommend solidarity will
far outweigh demand for those willing or happy to represent cooperators.
defense attorney who had been local prosecutor for fourteen years); United States v.
Giovanelli, No. 88 CR. 954 (S.D.N.Y.) (CBM), Trans. at 951-56 (testimony of Vincent
Cafaro) (cooperator tells how, after he had decided to cooperate and reached out to
government on own, he selected a new attorney from a list provided by a prosecutor).192 DERsHowrrz, supra note 27, at 401.
193 See Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification
of White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctnne, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1219, 1221 (1994); Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine
from the Attorney-Cient Privilege, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1273 (1990).
194 Forsgren, supra note 193, at 1222.
195 See Kin Cheung Wong v. Kennedy, 853 F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(discussing types of fee arrangements in case where retainer aggreement provided that if
lawyer's services "are terminated because of an unforeseen event" inital fee of $75,000
(with another $150,000 due two weeks before trial)-would be reduced to one based on
lawyer's hourly rate and "services actually rendered").
196 See Forsgren, supra note 193, at 1240 (noting "at least three instances" in which
government successfully urged co-defendant's defection as basis for disqualification of
remaining defendants' lawyers).
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Conflict of interests analyses that focus on lawyers with case-specific reasons to
deter cooperation-the "house counsel" interested in protecting the crime
family that sends him cases and fees, or the white-collar attorney who hopes for
more referrals and fees from the target corporation or lawyers to whom she
owes her employment-thus fail to capture the systemic effects that the
opportunity for such arrangements can have on the defense bar. One would
expect those lawyers whose zeal is based on economic self-interest to respond
to these market pressures, producing a corps of defense attorneys, in numbers
commensurate to the demand, prone to deter cooperation, irrespective of a
client's interests.
C. Conclusion
The ideologically or economically motivated "lawyers" discussed here are
just stick figures, presumed to have but one goal and to be ready to disregard
the duty of loyalty central to their profession. On the other hand, faith in the
professionalism of attorneys should not prevent us from admitting that, at the
very least, many of the most zealous defense attorneys may prefer that their
clients not cooperate. Those with practices based on appointments to represent
indigent clients or retainers from clients with little or no ability to review an
attorney's track record will have no economic reason to deter cooperation. But
these are the lawyers who, if zealous as a matter of ideology, are most likely to
be motivated by an ideology that is hostile to cooperation. At the other end of
the economic spectrum, those lawyers who handle the white-collar, organized
crime, and large-scale narcotics cases where large fees are to be had from
sophisticated clients may similarly be biased by the same ideological
motivations. And this ideological bias will surely be reinforced by (or be used
to mask) the powerful economic interest that they have in keeping their clients
from snitching.
IV. AcTuAL vs. POTENTIAL CoNFicT?
That a significant number of defense lawyers may be personally biased
against cooperation need not be, in itself, cause for concern. Many defendants
are similarly biased, and a defendant's champion against the extraordinary
power of the state ought not to be forced to tout the benefits of cooperation to
someone who just doesn't want to snitch. The issue thus becomes whether we
can be confident that a defendant is aware of what he may be giving up when
he retains a lawyer likely to discourage cooperation. Next, even if defendants
are not likely to make informed decisions in this regard, we must ask whether
there is any real evidence that the biases identified here actually infect the
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advice given to clients.
A. Disclosure Issues
The typical client who walks into William Kunstler's office knows that
Kunstler is not going to look favorably on an alliance with the government. 197
That knowledge is probably why the client came in the first place; he does not
want or need to be reminded of the sentencing breaks awarded to snitches.
Similarly, how can one suggest that Lopez did not receive adequate advice
from Barry Tarlow, who made clear from the outset that he would withdraw if
Lopez wanted to cooperate? 198 And doesn't the defendant who accepts a lawyer
paid or referred by his employer or criminal "boss" realize that such
arrangements are intended to breed solidarity against the government? The
issue in these cases appears to be one of disclosure. What degree of disclosure
is needed before we can be satisfied that a defendant has made an informed
choice?
Perhaps no degree of disclosure will suffice. Even the defendant who
makes an informed selection of a lawyer averse to cooperation may, as the time
for trial or plea-and possibly prison-draws near, want to revisit the option. If
he has the means, he might consult a new lawyer. But if he stays with his
original lawyer, he is not likely to get a fair assessment of his situation. In the
interests of preserving vigorous advocacy within the defense bar, however, we
should first consider a scheme that assumes a proper initial "waiver" might be
adequate.
The starting point for a satisfactory waiver would have to be a lawyer's
candid disclosure to her client that she will not represent a client who
cooperates or that she has a personal interest (economic or ideological) in her
client's not cooperating. This sort of announcement is what Tarlow did in
Lop z.199 It comports with ethical rules requiring a lawyer to disclose any
"interest" that might affect her representation of a defendant and then obtain
that client's consent before proceeding any further.2°° Full compliance with this
19 7 Kunstler has never been reticent about his ideological commitment to his work. See
David Margolick, Still Radical After All These Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1993, at B1-B2
(Kunstler stated: "I enjoy the spotlight, as most humans do, but it's not my whole raison
d'tre. My purpose is to keep the state from becoming all-domineering, all powerful. And
that's never changed.").
198 See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
199 United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 989 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
200 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(b) (1994) ("A lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the
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ethical norm would sweep quite broadly, extending not only to lawyers
personally repulsed by snitches or those with direct economic relationships with
the putative targets of a client's cooperation, but also to lawyers seeking to
avoid a reputation as a defector from defense camps.
Given the extent to which a defendant must rely on his lawyer's
assessments of the benefits and risks of cooperation, 201 the consequences of
incomplete disclosure can be severe, even where the defendant is aware that the
government is actively seeking his cooperation.202 But will full disclosure of an
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected;
and (2) the client consents after consultation."); MODEL CODE OF PROFSIONAL
RESPONSiBILrrY DR 5-101(A) (1983) ("Except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.5(a) (1993) ("At the earliest
feasible opportunity defense counsel should disclose to the defendant any interest in or
connection with the case or any other matter that might be relevant to the defendant's
selection of a lawyer to represent him or her .... ).
201 The importance of a lawyer's participation in this decision has, on occasion, been
ignored. Rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based, in part, on counsel's
failure to discuss the cooperation option with his client, the court in United States v. Turchi,
645 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 697 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
912 (1987), reasoned that if the defendant "knew of the various options that were his," his
lawyer's "failure to initiate a discussion concerning them is irrelevant." Id. at 568. See
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 463 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (Even though the
attorney of a police officer in a police corruption case had been retained and paid by police
union with policy of noncooperation with the special prosecutor, the court found no
prejudicial conflict of interest because (1) defendant did not claim that he was actually
dissuaded from cooperating, and (2) the attorney never advised him not to cooperate.).
202 See Robert S. Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects
of Legal Considtation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972, 982 (1961) (A client's "uncertainty, fear,
or ignorance of law renders him putty in an attorney's hands.").
A lawyer is bound to communicate the government's overtures to her client. See, e.g.,
United States v. Baylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bowers,
517 F. Supp. 666, 671 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The lawyer-client relationship encompasses at
the very least... an informed client who is cognizant of all proposals made by the
prosecutor."). It does not follow, however, that knowing of the government's interest in his
cooperation will allow a defendant to make an informed decision about that option. But see
United States v. Canessa, 644 F.2d 61, 63-64 (lst Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's
rejection of defendant's claim that attorney, who himself was a target of the grand jury's
investigation, rendered ineffective assistance by initially faling to communicate a
cooperation "invitation" from the government, and then failing to advise that the offer
should be accepted; because the defendant "had learned independently of the government's
[Vol. 56:69
COOPERATING CLIEN1
attorney's bias against cooperation cure the problem?203 Our respect for the
ideologically committed lawyer demands that we accept disclosure as a
satisfactory solution. Is a lawyer's professional duty so incompatible with her
political freedom that she should be barred from declaring and acting on an
ideological position against snitching (even where economic self-interest
actually motivates that position)?
This question brings us back to Barry Tarlow-whose ideological
commitment to an adversarial relationship with the government has not been
questioned (at least to my knowledge). Cranmpton and Udell have argued that:
Tarlow, by conditioning his representation of Lopez on an abandonment
by Lopez of any plea negotiations, restricted the scope of representation in
violation of professional ethics. Professional rules require a lawyer to "abide
by the client's decision... as to a plea to be entered," and an agreement
limiting the scope of representation that deprives the client of this authority is
professional misconduct.2 0
4
One might respond that Lopez was not foreclosed from considering
cooperation; Tarlow simply declared that he would withdraw if Lopez chose
that route. The coercive effect of such arrangements should not be
underestimated, however, because they threaten to impose significant, even
prohibitive, costs on a defendant. 205 Sometimes the costs will be financial, as
when the defendant has paid a substantial fee up front that will not be refunded,
or when the fee was paid by a third party who will not pay for a different
offer through his brother, knew the basic facts of his case, and had indicated his intention
not to cooperate," the district court reasoned, it was "immaterial whether [his lawyer] had
promptly conveyed the offer or ever recommended that it be accepted.").
203 There is no evidence that candor typically goes this far. See Marcy Strauss,
Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argwnent for Autonomy, 65
N.C. L. REv. 315, 342 (1987) ("[ciertain financial conflicts of interest between the
attorney's needs and the client's may discourage full communication.").
204 Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:
The Controversies over the Anti-Contract and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291,
352 n.256 (1992) (citing MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.2(a) & cmt. 5
(1994) ("Mhe client may not be asked to agree... to surrender... the right to settle
litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue.")).
205 See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 722-23
(1986-87) (lawyer's threat of withdrawal if client does not act as lawyer wishes is "an
attempt to persuade or pressure or intimidate" that can have "coercive" effect). This is not
to suggest a client will always be deterred from cooperating by his lawyer's withdrawal. See
United States v. Perez, 694 F. Supp. 854 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (After counsel refused to enter
cooperation discussions with government and withdrew from case, the defendant obtained
new counsel and quickly entered into a cooperation agreement.).
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lawyer, especially if the defendant chooses to cooperate. 206 A change in
counsel may cause a prolonged pretrial delay, which may be especially onerous
for a defendant who is not free on bail. Particularly where a defendant's initial
lawyer is known to refuse to pursue cooperation, switching lawyers may also
telegraph the defendant's consideration of this option, thereby placing the
defendant at risk or diminishing the value of his cooperation (if secrecy was
needed for it).207
A lawyer like Tarlow might respond that these costs are simply the price of
allowing lawyers some freedom to fix limits on their advocacy. Rule 1.16(b) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits withdrawal if it "can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client"20 8
or if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent." 20 9 Although Tarlow himself could not have relied on
this rule,210 the provision envisions that a lawyer's refusal to pursue a
"repugnant" objective will adversely affect her client's interests. 211 Still, it is
far from clear that Rule 1.16(b) licenses a lawyer unilaterally to impose or to
threaten imposing costs on her client for exercising his fundamental right to
206 See Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896, 904 (Pa.) (fee arrangement chills police officer
client from considering cooperation where his access to counsel paid by Fraternal Order of
Police depends on agreement not to cooperate), aff'd on reh'g, 352 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1975) (per
curium), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). No evidence appears to have been presented
in Lopez indicating that Tarlow's fees were not paid by his client. United States v. Lopez,
765 F. Supp. 1433, 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 989 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
207 The defendant who changes counsel simply to get unbiased advice may be forced
to snitch if his co-conspirators take (or are feared to take) this substitution as a sign that he
has actually made up his mind to do so. Where there is a risk that the co-conspirators will
respond with extra-legal sanctions (like mob "hits") or by rushing to make their own deals,
this defendant will find himself pressed to make his peace with the government quickly.
208 MoDEL RULEs oF PRoi ssioNAL CoNoucr Rule 1.16(b) (1994).
209 Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3).
210 No analogous provision appears in the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
Bar of California, adopted by the District Court of the Northern District of California in its
Local Rules. United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.) (Fletcher, I.,
concurring), anended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). Under these Rules, a
defense attorney "is not free to terminate his or her representation of a client at will, or for
mere personal considerations, or without the permission of the court." Id. at 1042-43.
2 11 See Stephen Gillers, Wtat We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 243, 260 (1985) ("The fact that the
lawyer may ethically withdraw despite an 'adverse effect' on a client's interests if she
considers one of the client's objectives 'imprudent' is an especially striking compromise of
client autonomy.") (footnote omitted).
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pursue the most advantageous plea agreement possible.212 And even were this a
defensible ethical norm, it would violate the Sixth Amendment absent a
defendant's consent.213
The issue, then, becomes whether Lopez could have intelligently consented
to his arrangement with Tarlow at its outset, as envisioned by Model Rule
1.2(c) which allows a lawyer to "limit the objectives of the representation if the
client consents after consultation." 214 This is not merely a question of an
attorney's freedom of action. As Gilson and Mnookin have recently shown, a
client seeking credibily to assure fellow participants in a prisoner's dilemma
that he will not defect on them would want a regime that allowed him to pick a
lawyer with a reputation for not defecting ("cooperating," in game theory
2 12 The Model Rues distinguish between "objectives" and "means," allowing an
attorney to withdraw where a client's "objective" is repugnant, but offering no such license
where the attorney merely objects to the client's "means." To the extent that snitching is just
a defendant's means of getting the lowest sentence possible, a lawyer's quarrel with this
course would seem to be based on choice of means. Any such classification, however, while
barring withdrawal, would arguably render cooperation the sort of "technical and legal
tactical issue" that the Rules entrust to lawyers. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2 cmt. (1994). The Rules admit that "[a] clear distinction between objectives and
means sometimes cannot be drawn," id., and this certainly is such a case. See Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 182, at 554 n.138 (explaining that the Model Rules are generally
ambiguous with respect to allocation of authority and arguing, with respect to Rule 1.2, that
"a choice of means that substantially effects attainment of the client's objective amounts to
an objective, which puts the matter under the sole authority of the client").
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility leaves far less room for debate. EC 7-8
notes that "[i]n the final analysis... , the lawyer should always remember that the decision
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for himself." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrrY EC 7-8 (1983); see id. DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) (lawyer can withdraw only if
client "[ilnsists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited
under the Disciplinary Rules.").
213 See Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1043 (Fletcher, I., concurring) ("a criminal defense lawyer
may not be entitled to assert moral repugnance to plea bargaining"); c. Brown v. Doe, 2
F.3d 1236, 1246 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Having selected confrontational counsel who found plea
bargaining repugnant, [defendant]... cannot claim that his lawyer was inadequate at that
stage of the proceeding."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1088 (1994); United States v. Wilson,
922 F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (7th Cir.) (attorney's threat to withdraw if defendant refused to
plead guilty "may have been improper," but no prejudice found), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
850 (1991); Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973) (counsel's threat to
withdraw if defendant moved to withdraw guilty plea held coercive).
214 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1994); see Freedman, supra note 169,
at 35 ("Tarlow limits the scope of the representation at the outset, in a way that maintains
the client's fundamental rights.") (footnote omitted).
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language) and allowed the lawyer to withdraw if the client sought to renege.215
To the extent we bar a client from "tying his hands" at the outset, we deprive
him of a signaling and bonding device that he might find critical to his chosen
defense.
We thus arrive at the question that arises not only when a lawyer wants her
client to eschew cooperation at the outset but also when a lawyer simply
discloses a bias against snitching: Is a client really in a position to assess his
lawyer's advice about cooperation in light of such disclosures? Here is where
the sharp divergence between the calculus of an actual defendant and that of a
hypothetical "prisoner" facing a precise and certain payout structure becomes
critical. The criminal defendant will likely know that cooperation is rewarded,
but through what filter should he view reports about the government's
credibility-and the benefits of cooperation more generally-when they come
from someone admittedly hostile to working with the government?2 16 How can
a defendant who gets such advice conceive of the payouts available to him? The
defendant who does not make the effort because he is so repulsed by the notion
of snitching probably has lost nothing. Others, fully appreciating their lawyers'
biases or possessing the ability to seek additional legal counsel from other
sources, might get the information they need. But if required to obtain-and, if
2 15 Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 182, at 556 ("Enhancing the cooperative lawyer's
ability to protect her investment in reputation expands rather than restricts the client's
control over how the lawyer conducts the client's litigation.").
216 In one example of the pro forma advice that can be given by lawyers admittedly
hostile to cooperation, a law firm simultaneously representing several co-defendants advised
each, in part:
[We have informed you... orally and we, by means of this communication, inform
you formally in writing that anyone whom we presently represent may, perhaps, make
an excellent self-serving negotiated plea bargain with the United States Attorney's
Office for cooperation and/or testimony; that you should carefully consider both the
benefits and the disadvantages to negotiating a plea bargain with the government which
involves cooperation, but that the most prominent advantage which you should be
formally aware of is the possibility of being able to obtain, from the United States
Attorney's Office, a promise of a non-custodial sentence or even perhaps a dismissal of
the charges; that if you... intend] to cooperate or wishn] for an attorney to commence
negotiations for purposes of cooperation, then please do not sign the appropriate place
at the end of this correspondence for you would be best served by obtaining
independent counsel to effectuate that intention ....
United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1500-01 n.14 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding this affidavit
to be "perfunctory" and incomplete in its recitation of possible conflicts of interest), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1237 (1988).
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not indigent, pay for217-a second lawyer in order to explore an option already
characterized as disadvantageous by one attorney, many defendants can be
expected to do nothing. This is especially true where a defendant finds his
lawyer's advice against snitching reinforced by social norms and by fears of
physical or economic retaliation. The point is not that defendant waivers can
never be knowing under these circumstances, but that many are not likely to be
SO.
To suggest, as the Second Circuit recently did, that a defendant receives
his due when he chooses a lawyer who has explicitly "abjured cooperation with
law enforcement authorities or plea bargaining" 218 is thus to ignore the role
that an attorney must play in explaining the cooperation calculus. Defendants
are regularly forced to make uncounseled decisions about cooperation in
stationhouses after they are arrested and are told that "the ship is sailing,"
"cooperate now if you want to get off easy." But once a defendant does have a
chance to consult with counsel-and has a constitutional right to do so-he
should not have to give up the chance to cooperate at the same time he picks
his lawyer.
B. Evidence of Actual Effect
In assessing the threat to a defendant's ability to get fair advice about
cooperation, one must do more than show that many of the most zealous
defense lawyers may have a motive to skew their advice, or even present
evidence that some do have that motive. Is there any reason to believe that
those motives actually affect the advice that defendants receive? It is no answer
to say that even though lawyers are often beset by personal conflicts that could
lead them to manipulate a client against his best interests, we can generally
presume that they will rise above self-interest.219 This presumption, while
appropriately developed to prevent excessive judicial or prosecutorial intrusion
into the defense function,220 can hardly predetermine our factual inquiry. So,
where to start?
217 Even assuming courts have discretion to authorize reimbursement where indigent
clients seek such second opinions, it is far from clear that judges would be so free with
public funds absent egregious conflicts of interest.
2 18 Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1245 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1088
(1994).
2 19 See, e.g., Fiumara v. United States, 727 F.2d 209, 212 (2d Cir.) ("A trial counsel
worthy of the name should be capable of subordinating his personal predilections to his
professional duty.") (quoting United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1258 (2d Cir.
1976)), cer. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984); Green, supra note 185, at 1224-27.
2 20 See infra text accompanying notes 236-39.
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Certain data are of little use. That many thousands of defendants decide to
cooperate221 says nothing about whether the "right" defendants are
cooperating. Some defendants may be pushed into cooperation. Some may be
willing to leap into uncertainty despite their attorneys' advice (whether biased
or disinterested) not to cooperate. Given the critical role that a lawyer's advice
will likely play in a client's cooperation decision, the existence of a class of
defendants (like Lopez) whose lawyers actively discouraged them from
cooperating but who nonetheless pursued that option and told the government
about their lawyers' efforts, suggests that there is an even larger class of
defendants who were deterred by their lawyers' advice. But this is only
speculative circumstantial evidence. Moreover, it may be that an attorney's
advice against cooperation reflects her honest assessment of the government's
credibility.
Postconviction challenges to a defense counsel's performance provide some
direct, albeit anecdotal, evidence of biased efforts to discourage cooperation.222
But this proof is not very trustworthy. The defendant facing a long stay in
prison, with his criminal associates already convicted and his information stale,
will be all too quick to claim that he "would have" cooperated, but for his
221 Between October 1, 1990, and September 30, 1991, 3,786 defendants received
downward departures from their presumptive Guideline sentences based on "substantial
assistance" to the government. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 140. This number-
which covers only federal defendants-does not include defendants whose intentions or
efforts did not meet with government approval, or defendants whose cooperation led to the
dismissal of their indictments. A sampling of presentence reports in seven federal districts
for offenders convicted or sentenced in fiscal years 1976-78 found that 7.7% of the white-
collar defendants had cooperated with the authorities-20% for securities fraud-compared
to 11.9% of the "common crime" defendants. See WEISBUND r AL., supra note 126, at
104.
222 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (allegation that defendant was advised to retain lawyer by superior in terrorist
organization which paid half of attorney's fees; attorney advises defendant not to cooperate);
United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegation that defendant's original
counsel, whose fees were paid by third party and who simultaneously represented
defendant's "boss," discouraged cooperation), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237 (1988); United
States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 119 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (An attorney
retained by defendant's co-defendants "made no attempt to explore the possibility of
[defendant's]... cooperation with the government's investigation, even though the
government was willing to negotiate about such cooperation.") (footnote omitted); United
States v. Turchi, 645 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 697 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 912 (1987); United States v. Lonetree, 35 M.J. 396 (C.M.A. 1992)
(Marine embassy guard convicted of espionage claims that defense attorney William
Kunstler saw the case as political cause and pressed defendant to cease cooperating.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1813 (1993).
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lawyer, and to seek a reversal of his conviction, or a reduction of sentence, on
that basis. Although attorneys may also be less than candid in denying
allegations of unprofessional conduct,223 the account of a defendant who seeks
the benefits of cooperation without taking the risks must always be suspect. 224
Appropriately discounted, postconviction claims do offer some insights on
certain attorney-client conflicts that affect cooperation decisions, but the sources
of these alleged conflicts are generally case specific: the legal fees of a putative
cooperator have been paid by a putative target, or the target is simultaneously
represented by the same lawyer. On occasion, a defendant has alleged that his
attorney's ideological biases impeded his access to fair advice about
cooperation. 225 But I have not been able to find any claim that a lawyer's
interest in maintaining a professional reputation as a promoter of defense
solidarity prejudiced a defendant. The unlikelihood that a defendant would even
be aware of this problem makes the absence of such claims not surprising. And
223 Some lawyers can be completely unperturbed by a former client's allegations of
ineffective assistance. In response to the claim of the defendant in Lonetree, 35 M.Y 396,
)William Kunstler, described as "the New York lawyer associated with politically charged
trials," was reported to say "that as a matter of principle he would not dispute claims of
ineffective counsel. 'If they can win their case by proving any dereliction on my part, it
would be all for the good and I cheer him on,' he has said." Neil A. Lewis, Convicted
Marine's Legal Advice to Be Reviewed, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1992, at 29.
224 Such postconviction challenges are typically opposed by the government, which
must ensure that defendants who have not actually cooperated do not receive the benefits
reserved for those who have taken the plunge. Yet this understandable hostility to
postconviction claims means that the government is least interested in exploring alleged
conflicts when defendants are most anxious to tell about them. Conversely, at the
investigative or pretrial stage, when, as a basis for disqualifying his lawyer, the government
claims that a conflict of interest is improperly deterring a defendant from cooperating, the
defendant will often deny that any conflict exists. See, e.g., United States v. Kenney, 911
F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1983); In re
Investigation before February, 1977 Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977);
In re Investigation before April 1975, Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); In re Special Grand Jury, 480 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Wisc. 1979); Pirillo v. Takiff,
341 A.2d 896 (Pa.), affid on reh'g, 352 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083
(1976). These litigation postures may be quite explicable, but they impede efforts to explore
defender attitudes toward cooperation.
225 Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1993) (defendant in armored car
robbery committed on behalf of Weather Underground claims that his "revolutionary
lawyers" refused to consider cooperation and "pursued a confrontational defense strategy
jointly with counsel for his co-defendants in furtherance of 'radical political beliefs'"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1088 (1994); Lonetree, 35 MJ. 396 (concerning Marine embassy guard
convicted of espionage who claims that defense attorney William Kunstler saw the case as
political cause and pressed defendant to cease cooperating).
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given that postconviction claims supported by far more concrete conflict of
interest allegations face an uphill battle in court,226 a savvy defendant may
realize the slim chances of such a speculative claim.
There is, then, a marked paucity of hard evidence that defendants are
deterred from cooperating by lawyers seeking to protect reputations in the
marketplace. Still, we find important clues in Kenneth Mann's insightful study
of the white-collar defense bar in New York City. Attorneys told Mann that
they frequently felt pressured by other lawyers to participate in a joint defense
against the government irrespective of their clients' best interests. 227 Mann also
found evidence of "messages communicated between attorneys that they are
prepared to influence their clients." 228 Yet he resisted drawing any
conclusions:
[Diespite the[sel m ges .... the actual occurrence of this kind of
cooperation [against the government] was more difficult to capture than
perhaps any other research topic. The findings did not reveal directly any
instance of an attorney who appeared to resist providing information to the
226 To obtain postconviction relief on the theory that a conflict of interest prevented his
counsel from rendering constitutionally effective assistance, a defendant must show an
"actual" conflict, not merely "the possibility of conflict." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
350 (1980); see United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1992). Then he
must show that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's performance," by
demonstrating that the actual conflict caused an identifiable "lapse in representation."
CuYler, 446 U.S. at 348; see also United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
One court recently required even more. In Brown v. Doe, although presented with a
claim that counsel's ideology led her to provide ineffective assistance, the court declined to
apply the Cuyler standard and applied the more demanding standard of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), reasoning that a lawyer needed to have a conflicting
loyalty to another person for there to be a cognizable conflict of interest:
Whatever baggage Ms. Williams brought to Brown's case, she had no conflict of
interest. Ms. Wlliarns represented Brown only, and could therefore counsel him on
whether to plead guilty or become a witness for the state, without regard to the interests
of any other defendant .... Ms. Williams made a reasoned decision to make common
cause with other defendants and defense counsel; whether or not that decision was
motivated by revolutionary solidarity, it was arrived at free of any legal or ethical
obligation to any defendant but Brown.
Brown, 2 F.3d. at 1247 (citation omitted). But see United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867
(2d Cir. 1984) (conflict of interest where counsel implicated in crimes for which client on
trial).
2 27 MANN, supra note 42, at 178-79.
228 Id. at 180.
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government where it would help his client, in order to serve the interest of
another attorney's client, nor did any attorney state that he actually ever did
this or saw others do it. The question left open, then, was whether these
attorneys simply feign this kind of cooperation while always acting in their
client's own best interest or whether the particular cases did not provide
instances of this kind of cooperation in spite of the fact that it does occur.22 9
A third alternative is that the attorneys interviewed were loathe to admit to
unethical conduct, or accuse others of it.23 0 The white collar bar is only so big,
and it is hard to imagine an attorney continuing to "feign" a readiness to
maintain a joint defense after she had reneged on similar assurances to her
colleagues in previous cases. She may be able to "puff" once, but if she intends
to remain in that segment of the market, where information pooling
opportunities abound, her colleagues will judge her on results, not
assurances. 23 1 That such assurances are given thus suggests that lawyers seek
to "deliver" on them.
Although more evidence is needed before this hypothesis about market
incentives disfavoring cooperation can be deemed "proved," it seems likely
enough. When such informed speculation is taken together with what we know
about more case-specific conflicts of interest, and about the declared ideologies
of certain defense attorneys, a troubling picture emerges: the systemic failure of
some of the most zealous defenders to give clients fair advice about
cooperation. If this picture is true, the government certainly has cause to be
concerned because this agency cost in the market where the government "buys"
information is over and above that created by more case-specific conflicts. 232
229 Id.
23 0 The bias in a biased attorney's advice will not always be intentional. As Robert
Gordon has noted:
Lawyers who say they just provide technical input and lay out the options while leaving
the decisions and methods of implementing them up to their clients are kidding
themselves by failing to recognize or admit that clients will process their advice
differently depending on the form and manner and setting in which they give it.
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 30 (1988).
231 See also Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 182, at 562 (Professional organizations
"make it easier and cheaper to impose informal sanctions for defection through gossip and
reputational damage than would be true in a more atomistic world.").
23 2 See Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 508 (addressing "plea bargaining system's role as
a device through which a prosecutor 'buys information'"); Schulhofer, supra note 148, at
49-50 (discussing conflicts of interests as "agency costs" in context of plea bargaining); cf
Standen, supra note 71, at 1488 n.51 (suggesting that prosecutors bid against criminal
conspiracies for a defendant's information, each offering some combination of threats and
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But the government can at least partially compensate for these costs by
tinkering with the incentives it offers-making them larger or more certain.
Individual defendants have no corresponding options, and when society's
disdain for snitching is reinforced by a defense attorney's pressures, the harm
to them is clear.
V. OTHER SOURCES OF ADVICE ABOUT COOPERATION
Although evidence, however tentative, that defendants are not likely to
receive fair advice about their cooperation options must be cause for concern,
the problem is far easier to identify than to cure. The numerically more
significant aspect of the problem-the "cop out" lawyers who push their clients
into cooperating in order to get rid of cases with a minimum of effort-might,
and ought to, be addressed, as Stephen Schulhofer has suggested, by
"restructur[ing] the economic relationship between defense attorney and client"
in order to encourage more zealous advocacy.23 3 Such a restructuring could
entail a voucher system, like the one recently proposed by Professors
Schulhofer and David Friedman,234 that gives indigent defendants some
freedom of choice. Although the purchasing decisions of many-if not most-
of these new consumers might be based on less information than their richer or
more experienced brethren, a market approach seems more promising than the
illusory guarantee of state monitoring on which we now rely.23 5 But what can
we do about the problem of defendants steered away from cooperating because
benefits).
233 Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 1999; see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO REvIEW
THE CRIMuNALJLsUTIcE Acr, 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2265 (Jan. 29, 1993); Richard Klein,
The Eleventh Cormandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.. 363 (1993).
234 Shulhofer & Friedman, supra note 152.
235 Shulhofer and Friedman note:
While the state's primary role ... is providing the voucher, there is no reason
why it cannot also provide information. The court or county government could inform
indigent defendants as to which firms it believes do a good job. Defendants would be
free to discount the recommendation if they suspected that the state was more
concerned with their interests than with theirs. Such an arrangement allows defendants
to have both the informational advantage of state choice of provider and the incentive
advantage of defendant choice.
Id. at 114. The official dissemination of information about private attorney performance-if
accurate--could also help those defendants able to retain counsel but searching in the same
segment of the defense bar that competes for indigents' vouchers.
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of their attorneys' personal interests?
A. Judicial Intervention
It is of little help to say that lawyers who place their own ideological or
economic concerns over their clients' interests should be disqualified. Even
when a defendant wishes to waive his right to unconflicted representation, trial
judges have "an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are
conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." 23 6 However, in the absence
of particularized evidence, an attorney will not, and should not, face
disqualification on the basis of suppositions about how her ideological or
economic interests might affect her advice to a potential cooperator. Any
standard that permitted an attorney's removal in such cases, if regularly
invoked, would either, deprive the defense bar of many of its most zealous
advocates, or, if selectively invoked (as is far more likely), be susceptible of
abuse by prosecutors seeking to remove their ablest adversaries. 23 7 Moreover,
disqualification proceedings, regardless of their outcomes, can put undue
pressure on those defendants who have made informed decisions not to
cooperate and are comfortable with lawyers committed to standing fast against
the government.23 8
236 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988); see Green, supra note 185.
237 See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When
Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interests, 16 AM. 1. CRIM. L. 323 (1989);
Ephraim Margolin & Sandra Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense
Counsel, 20 AM. CaiM. L. REv. 227, 229 (1982) (The authors opined, "based on
familiarity with more than a dozen cases in which... disqualification 'inquiries' have been
filed,... [that] the government's primary motive in bringing such motions is to disqualify
the most competent lawyers and firms, with little regard for their reputation for ethical
practice.").
238 Green explains:
The [disqualification] ... inquiry may undermine the defendant's confidence in his
attorney by causing him to question whether defense counsel is qualified to provide a
vigorous defense. It may also threaten the effectiveness of counsel's representation by
dampening counsel's ardor. And, unless the trial judge receives information from
defense counsel ex parte or precludes the prosecution from making evidentiary and
investigative use of defense counsel's representations to the court, a hearing on a
disqualification motion may result in the disclosure of otherwise confidential
information, which may then be used by the prosecutor against the defendant.
Green, supra note 185, at 1233.
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Limiting disqualification to cases where there is particularized evidence of
a conflict can result in significant under-enforcement of ethical norms, because
such evidence will often not be known outside of the defense camp or even be
disclosed to the client. A lawyer is not apt to tell her client that she intends to
dissuade him from cooperating in order to protect a third party or her
professional reputation, and may not even announce an ideological rejection of
snitching. The client who is aware of such conflicts may not disclose them to
the court or government, either out of fear or because he has taken his lawyer's
advice.239 Nonetheless, because any coercive effort to acquire this information
would have the unfortunate effect of threatening the very right the effort
purports to guarantee-the right of a defendant to get fair advice about whether
he ought to cooperate or fight-disqualification must remain an extraordinary
measure. The response to vague allegations of conflict must, therefore, be a
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that attorneys will behave ethically irrespective
of their ideological or personal interests.
A far less intrusive way to correct any imbalance in advice about
cooperation might be to provide additional advice about cooperation from
another source. If, after understanding his options, a defendant wished to
pursue a strategy of solidarity with his co-defendants, he could-save in
extraordinary cases where a court found disqualification appropriate-be free to
waive his right to unconflicted representation and choose an attorney committed
to do battle with the government. Were judges to preside over this process,
they would have essentially two options: They could give the advice to
defendants themselves, or they could bring new defense counsel into the case
for this purpose-a sort of limited-purpose disqualification. Neither of these
The issue of judicial pressure was dramatically raised when three of the defendants
convicted in the World Trade Center bombing trial sought to be represented at sentencing
and on appeal by William Kunstler and Ronald Kuby, who also represented defendants in a
related conspiracy case awaiting trial. The district judge summarily disqualified Kunstler
and Kuby, suggesting that the convicted defendants had to consider cooperating and would
be ill-served by lawyers who also represented the putative targets of any such cooperation.
United States v. Salameh, 93 No. Cr. 180 (KTM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7904 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 1994). Unsuccessfully seeking to overturn the disqualification order, counsel
argued that "all three defendants had long ago been informed of their 'right' to become
informers and to make deals to better themselves at the expense of others," and "by their
choice of Kunstler and Kuby [had] made it clear that they reject such an option." Petition
for Writ of Mandamus, at 14, In the Matter of the Application of Mahmoud Abouhalima,
No. 94-3038 (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 1994).
239 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1983) (When arrested,
the defendant told agents that he wanted to cooperate but feared that his lawyer, retained by
his drug boss, would tell the boss about his defection. When the lawyer's disqualification
was sought, the defendant denied having made these statements.).
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options, however, is satisfactory.
Judges often find themselves obliged to advise defendants about potential
conflicts of interest where particularized facts give reason for concern, but any
conflict is waivable. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) requires that
inquiry be made whenever co-defendants are jointly represented by the same
attorney, and case law has mandated similar procedures for other potential
conflicts. 240 But what facts should lead a judge to fear that a defendant has not
been sufficiently advised about his cooperation options? The judge will know
when a defendant shares the same lawyer with a potential target, but she may
not be aware that a defendant's lawyer has been paid by a target or was
referred by the target's lawyer. Certainly she is unlikely to know that an
attorney, although independently retained by the defendant, wants to establish a
reputation for not representing snitches.
Even if judges, with the eager assistance of the prosecution, could reliably
identify those defendants needing additional advice about cooperation, their
intervention would likely be to no avail. For a judge merely to inform a
defendant that his lawyer may have reason to deter cooperation does nothing to
make cooperation any less a leap into the unknown. Yet the judge is not
positioned to provide much more than that. Without knowing the details of the
government's case and hearing a proffer from the defendant, a judge cannot
assess the value of his information, much less evaluate how much of a
sentencing discount it could bring, even when she would be the sentencer.
Moreover, even were she able to give such an evaluation, its value could
quickly be nullified by the defendant's lawyer who will likely have a far closer
relationship with the defendant. 241 The judge who appears to be touting the
240 See, e.g., United States v. Lanni, 970 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 140 (1992); United States v.
Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); United
States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 744-45 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Ayodeji v. United
States, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888 (2d Cir. 1982).
241 Lowenthal's observations about the advice given to defendants in joint
representation cases are equally apposite here:
[A] simple admonishment by a trial judge who is unfamiliar with the intricacies of the
defense and cannot pierce the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is no
substitute for a confidential and frank exchange of thoughts between a defendant and his
lawyer. In addition, many criminal defendants inherently regard the court with
suspicion and are unlikely to give the judge's words much credence.
Lowenthal, supra note 165, at 970; see United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 624
(D.NJ. 1977) (limitations of judicial advice about joint representation), aft'd, 570 F.2d
1177 Od Cir. 1978).
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virtues of snitching will only confirm a defendant's worst fears about an
alliance between court and prosecutor, leading him to disregard the advice, or
to feel some additional pressure to cooperate-two equally unfortunate
results. 242
The danger of judicial coercion-intended or not-might be avoided by
bringing in an independent lawyer, a device courts often use to ensure that
defendants get fair advice about the pitfalls of joint representation. 243 However,
such attorneys may themselves have reason to deter cooperation (or unduly
encourage it244). And even were their advice unbiased, the likelihood that it
could be nullified by the defendant's original lawyer would remain. In sum,
judicial intervention, if circumscribed to prevent coercion, would not likely be
effective in correcting any imbalance in the advice that defendants receive about
cooperation.
B. Prosecutorial Intervention
The other candidate to supplement the advice a defendant gets from his
lawyer about cooperation is the prosecution, which would love to step into the
breach and deal directly with a defendant on this issue. Indeed, government
agents or prosecutors regularly solicit cooperation from defendants soon after
arrest24 5 -or even before246-when "interference" from lawyers can best be
242 See Alschuler, supra note 82, at 1123 ("For a judge to raise the prospect that a
particular defendant might plead guilty would be likely to indicate a judicial preference that
he do so--at least to a defendant willing to read between the lines. Even this possibly
unintended persuasion would be inconsistent with a trial judge's obligation of
impartiality."). Judicial advice about cooperation might also be considered a violation of
FED. R. CIM. P. 11(e)(1)'s ban on judicial participation in plea discussions. See United
States v. Garfield, 987 F.2d 1424, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1993) (blanket prohibition on judicial
participation in plea discussions ensures that no defendant is coerced, protects integrity of
courts, and preserves judge's impartiality).
2 43 See United States v. Villarreal, 554 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.) (trial court appoints special
public defender to advise defendant about potential conflict), cert. dsmissed, 434 U.S. 802
(1977); United States v. Bailin, 731 F. Supp. 865, 872 (N.D. MII. 1990), aff'd, 977 F.2d 270
(1992); United States v. Biometric Affiliated Research Lab., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 106
(S.D.N.Y.) (private attorney, acting pro bono, appointed to advise defendant awaiting
sentencing about "desirability or lack of desirability" of cooperating with government
against target represented by same lawyer who had represented her at trial), aff'd, 634 F.2d
619 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); Lowenthal, supra note 165, at 970 n.102.
244 An attorney who seeks more such appointments, or has other reasons for currying
favor with the court, may advise a defendant to cooperate simply to help a judge get a case
off her docket.245 WILoN, supra note 51, at 73 ("Efforts to flip a suspect begin almost with the
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avoided. Until formal charges have been brought, defendants generally have no
constitutional right to counsel, 247 and those without money to retain an attorney
will invariably not yet have one. But once a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches, courts (at least by assumption) have barred the
government from circumventing his lawyer simply to tout cooperation.248 A
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel under these circumstances-where,
for example, the government has disrupted his relationship with counsel either
by giving contrary advice or by calling counsel's integrity into question-will
moment of his arrest. The critical period is the hours between his being taken into custody
and his formal arraignment. In this period, his uncertainty is greatest and his defense the
lowest."); see Dix, supra note 30, at 247 ("For a variety of reasons, and perhaps especially
in drug cases, officers may be willing to 'deal' with a suspect only if the suspect is willing to
deal immediately, with the officers, and without consulting counsel or others.").
Perhaps the government's ability to tout cooperation at this early stage can be seen as
counteracting, or even justifying, a bias against cooperation in the advice that a defendant
later receives from his lawyer. But this "balance" is false, if the autonomy of a defendant is
to be respected.
246 See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1979) (prior to
seeking indictment, agents and prosecutor confronted suspect with evidence of his criminal
activity and sought his cooperation, suggesting that he might walk away "scot free").
247 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984).
2 4 8 See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 362-64 (1981) (assuming, without
deciding, that agents violated indicted defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
they met with defendant without her counsel's knowledge, disparaged counsel's
performance, and touted benefits of cooperation); United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259,
266 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Walker, 839 F.2d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1988)
(assuming, without deciding, that defendant's right to counsel was violated when informant
and agent encouraged cooperation without knowledge of defense attorney); People v.
Hayes, 246 Cal. Rptr. 750, 755 (Cal. App. 1988); State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 400-01
(Utah App. 1990). But see Weiss, 599 F.2d at 739 (holding that cooperation pitches by
government agent and prosecutor that included suggestion that it would not be in
defendant's "best interests" to contact his attorney would not have violated Sixth
Amendment, even if they had occurred during accusatory stage, because attorney was a
target of investigation and defendant had reason to know "what was behind" this warning).
Some courts, like the district court in Lopez, will not characterize government
interference with a defendant's right to counsel as a Sixth Amendment "violation" unless the
defendant can show the "prejudice" that, at least since Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), is a
prerequisite for relief. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
rev'd, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), armended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 1979).
But these courts would likely agree that, as a prospective matter, the government is
constitutionally barred from circumventing defense counsel for purposes of soliciting a
defendant's cooperation.
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be at least presumptively invalid.249 The issue thus becomes whether this
understandable effort to prevent the government from driving a wedge between
defendant and attorney once adversarial proceedings have commenced should
be reconsidered in light of evidence suggesting a bias within the defense bar
against cooperation. The question almost answers itself.
To allow the government free reign to circumvent defense counsel would
undermine the influence of a possibly biased advisor only to leave a defendant
at the mercy of a party whose bias is certain. Conceivably, a prosecutor or
agent could supplement defense counsel's advice by giving the defendant a
better idea or just an alternative view about the strength of the government's
case and the likely benefits of cooperation. However, the defendant who acts
on this information without ascertaining the government's track record for
holding up its end of cooperation agreements does so at his peril. The only
reliable source of information about the government's record will be his
defense lawyer-or at least a defense lawyer. A lawyer who wants to deter
cooperation may mislead her client as to the government's credibility or
otherwise cause him to reject anything he may have heard from the
government. But any scheme that permits the government to court a
defendant's cooperation behind his lawyer's back by giving advice at odds with
the lawyer's or, even worse, by disparaging counsel's ability or integrity can
only drive a wedge between attorney and client25 0 and rob the defendant of his
only real guarantee that the government will deal fairly with him.
But what is to prevent the government from violating the Sixth Amendment
by trying to "flip" a defendant behind his lawyer's back? Certainly not the
constitutional provision itself-at least not since United States v. Morrison.25 1
In Morrison, federal agents met with an indicted defendant without her
lawyer's knowledge and, after disparaging her attorney's abilities, touted the
benefits of cooperation. The defendant refused to cooperate, kept her lawyer,
and instead sought the dismissal of the indictment based on the agent's violation
of her right to counsel. After the Third Circuit held dismissal to be the
249 Where the government's postindictment contact with a defendant is limited to
interrogation, waiver will be upheld "[s]o long as the accused is made aware of the 'dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation. ' " Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299-300
(1988) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
250 Although the Justice Department would distinguish between simply giving a
defendant "information" about cooperation without his lawyer knowing about it and
"disparag[ing]" opposing counsel, Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 10,092-93 (1994) (commentary to §§ 77.8 and 77.9) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 77), any cooperation pitch at odds with defense counsel's advice will inevitably call
counsel's ability and/or integrity into question, especially if the point at issue involves the
degree to which the government can be trusted. The distinction, thus, may often be illusory.
251 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
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appropriate remedy,252 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that to obtain such
relief for a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must show prejudice even
where the violation has been deliberate.253 Here, the Court concluded, the
defendant had "demonstrated no prejudice of any kind, either transitory or
permanent, to the ability of her counsel to provide adequate representation in
these criminal proceedings." 254
Whatever Morrison's logic, its effect is virtually to remove all
constitutional constraints on government efforts to recruit cooperators without
the knowledge of their attorneys. The overreaching prosecutor can send an
agent to visit an indicted defendant in his jail cell or home and explain how
cooperation is his only sensible option; maybe the agent will disparage the
integrity or legal abilities of the defendant's lawyer. If the defendant is
unpersuaded, and opts to keep his lawyer and fight the government, the only
cost to the government will be the suppression of any statements the defendant
may have made during this improper interview. 255 Even if the government
drives a wedge between attorney and client that forces the defendant to find a
new lawyer, no relief will be forthcoming so long as the new lawyer is
adequate. 256 If, on the other hand, the defendant is persuaded by the
252 United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
253 Monison, 449 U.S. at 365.
254 Id. at 366.
255 United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 265-67 (4th Cir. 1990) (no constitutional
violation resulting from improper government cooperation pitch that disparaged defense
counsel where no information used by government and defendant afterwards reaffirmed his
loyalty to attorney; prejudice said to be "element" of Sixth Amendment claim); see also
United States v. Walker, 839 F.2d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1988).
In United States v. Martinez, two prosecutors, while waiting for a defendant's lawyer to
arrive to examine evidence with his client, and contrary to the defense lawyer's specific
request, spoke with the defendant at length, trying to convince him to cooperate. 785 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1986). The prosecutors assured the defendant that his family could be
protected, and that he would "not violate any Catholic principles" or be a "Judas" if He
testified truthfully. Id. at 113. When defendant's lawyer finally arrived, the prosecutors told
him of their conversation, and then discussed the possibility of a plea without cooperation.
After a deal was reached and defendant pleaded guilty, he later sought to withdraw his plea,
claiming, inter alia, that the government's conduct constituted "a per se justification for
withdrawal." Id. at 114. Upholding the district court's denial of his motion, the Third
Circuit found that the defendant had "failed to make a credible showing that the
government's conduct had any effect on his decision to plead guilty." Id. at 114-115.
256 See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 989
F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Ford,
793 P.2d 397, 403 (Utah App. 1990) (A defense lawyer's resignation as result of
government's improper contacts with client was found not to support relief under Sixth
Amendment, where there was no claim by defendant that the "loss of [his original lawyer]
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government's overtures, he likely will cooperate, and having tied his fortunes
to the government's favor, never challenge the way the government recruited
him.25 7 The only real danger will come from the cooperation arrangement that
goes sour. But even here, the defendant will still need to show prejudice. 25 8 In
constitutional terms, the unscrupulous prosecutor or agent thus risks little by
trying to circumvent the lawyer of the defendant whose cooperation he
seeks.25 9
The weakness of present constitutional restraints260 highlights the salutary
prevented him from effectively asserting his defense at trial or that substitute counsel
otherwise inadequately represented him.").
257 This is not to say that the defendant may not have been prejudiced. Perhaps he
would have been acquitted had he gone to trial; perhaps his attorney could have obtained a
more favorable deal from the government had she controlled all contacts with the
defendant.
258 Where the government goes so far as to conclude an agreement with the defendant
in the absence of his lawyer, some courts have found cognizable prejudice in the fact that
the agreement was not as favorable to the defendant as one a lawyer could have negotiated.
See Ford, 793 P.2d at 404 (ordering remand to determine whether defendant would have
received a better bargain from the state for agreeing to act in sting operation before his trial
had state not circumvented his lawyer in recruiting his cooperation).
In People v. Hayes, 246 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. App. 1988), the police approached the
defendant after indictment and, without his lawyer's knowledge, recruited him to cooperate
in an investigation of his lawyer. Remanding for a finding as to whether defendant
cooperated in good faith, the appellate court noted:
[A] defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated where governmental
agents initiate contact and negotiate an agreement directly with a defendant who is
represented, concerning the case in which he is represented. However, absent a
defendant's assent and his attempt to comply with that agreement in good faith, we fail
to see what prejudice may have accrued to the defendant.... [l]f a defendant goes
forward in good faith and attempts to comply with an agreement that is less than what
counsel reasonably could have negotiated for him, he has been prejudiced.
Id. at 757 (citations omitted); see also People v. Moore, 129 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Cal. App.
1976) (basing relief on Due Process Clause where, after defendant contacted authorities and
agreed to cooperate, they instructed him not to tell his lawyer about his cooperation, and
disparaged counsel's professional abilities).
259 The defendant at whose trial a cooperator testifies lacks standing to claim a
violation of the witness's Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000,
1006 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
260 When confronted with abuses they deem egregious, courts may still act even where
the only prejudice to the defendant is that he was forced to switch lawyers. In Boulas v.
Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. App. 1986), the defendant, without telling his
retained attorney, contacted the authorities to discuss cooperation. A prosecutor then told
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role that the disciplinary rules can play in regulating contacts by government
attorneys or their "agents" 261 with potential cooperators after indictment.
While the dust has yet to settle on the debate about the extent to which DR 7-
104's "no contact" rule should apply to prosecutors, 262 the provision at least
increases the likelihood that a prosecutor will face a cost if he or one of his
agents tries to flip an indicted 263 defendant without the knowledge of his
lawyer.264 The cost might under extraordinary circumstances be the dismissal
him that a deal could be made only if he were to replace his lawyer "with counsel who
would be acceptable to the district attorney." Id. at 488. The following day, a police officer
reiterated this condition, explaining that "the authorities did not trust... [the lawyer]
because... [he] was a user of drugs." Id. Defendant discharged his lawyer, and the police
steered him to a former prosecutor now in private practice. On being informed that
defendant was already going to cooperate, however, the new lawyer withdrew, leaving the
defendant to cooperate on his own. When the police soon informed him that the deal was
off, he went back to his original lawyer and moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming
violations of his rights to counsel and a fair trial. Rejecting the state's claim that defendant
could not prove prejudice within the meaning of Morrison because he had ended up with
competent counsel and no information relating to the pending charges had been obtained
from him, a California appeals court required the trial court, which had declined to dismiss
the charges, to do so. Noting that "[clriminal defense lawyers are not fungible," id. at 491,
the court distinguished Morrison by pointing to the participation of the prosecutor's office in
the violation here, holding "the government conduct.., to be outrageous in the extreme,
and shocking to the conscience," id. at 494, and finding support for its ruling in the
California Constitution, as well as the Sixth Amendment. Id.
261 See Green, supra note 10, at 300-09 (discussing varying extents to which courts
have held prosecutors responsible for the conduct of police officers and federal agents).
262 See supra note 10. For me, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBiLrrY DR 7-
104 (1983), is merely a second-best means of protecting defendants against unfair attempts
by the government to gain cooperation, in the absence of a more sensitive Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. Whether we ought to be relying on disciplinary rules, as
enforced by local disciplinary authorities, to restrict government conduct in this delicate
area is beyond the scope of this Article.
263 Although DR 7-104's bar extends to contacts with "represented" parties and does
not explicitly recognize the distinction between indicted and unindicted defendants so
important in Sixth Amendment cases, a number of courts have held that prosecutors are
bound by the rule only after indictment. See United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir.
1988) (refusing to "bindi- the Code's applicability to the moment of indictment" because
"an indictment's return lies substantially within the control of the prosecutor"), cen. denied,
498 U.S. 871 (1990). In any event, this Article focuses only on defendants who have
already been formally charged.
264 No recourse to the disciplinary rules is needed where the government does not
discuss the legal ramifications of cooperation with a defendant but merely seeks information
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of the indictment, as an exercise of a court's supervisory power.265 Or it might
be the threat of personal disciplinary sanctions. In either case, however, there
will be some real deterrent to Sixth Amendment violations. 266
C. Defendant-Initiated Contacts
Although DR 7-104 can help ensure that an indicted defendant has a lawyer
by his side to put the government's cooperation pitch into perspective, the
likelihood that there are a significant number of defense lawyers biased against
cooperation strongly counsels against using the rule to flatly prevent the
government from speaking with the defendant who initiates cooperation
discussions without his lawyer's knowledge. 267 The defendant who
about his alleged crimes. Suppression of the defendant's statements may be an adequate
remedy here if a Sixth Amendment violation is found.
265 Even as the Ninth Circuit found the dismissal of the indictment to have been
inappropriate on the facts in Lopez, it suggested that "such an extreme remedy" might have
been an appropriate exercise of the district court's supervisory powers had the
"government's conduct... caused substantial prejudice to the defendant and been flagrant
in its disregard for the limits of appropriate professional conduct." United States v. Lopez,
989 F.2d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir.), anended and superseded, 4 F.3d 455 (9th Cir. 1993). It
remains to be seen whether the "prejudice" the Circuit was referring to is something
different from the "prejudice" that the Supreme Court required in Morrison for Sixth
Amendment relief, see supra text accompanying notes 253-54. A rule permitting the
dismissal of indictments as an exercise of supervisory power in cases where Morrison would
not authorize such relief might not offend the Supreme Court, which has noted that the
power has been used "to prevent parties from reaping benefit or incurring harm from
violations of substantive or procedural rules (imposed by the Constitution or laws)
governing matters apart from the trial itself." United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735,
1741 (1992). Lately, however, the Court has been hostile to the expansive use of
supervisory powers by lower courts. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.
250 (1988); United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Powers in Criminal Cases, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1455-62 (1984).
266 Internal regulations-like those proposed by the Bush and Clinton Justice
Departments, see supra note 4-can provide an additional deterrent for prosecutors and
other law enforcement personnel.
267 MoDEL CODE OF PRoFIONAL REsPoNsiBIrrY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983), if applied
to prosecutors, would bar them from communicating with a lawyer's client "on the subject
of the representation... unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such
other party." See United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor
violated DR 7-104 when he failed to notify defendant's attorney that defendant had called to
indicate desire to cooperate even though defendant "requested that his cooperation be kept a
secret because he feared for his safety if his cooperation became known"), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 964 (1980). But see Cramton & Udell, supra note 204, at 343 (observing that
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circumvents his attorney does not necessarily doubt her ability or integrity or
fear that she will alert potential targets of his interest in cooperation. Lopez
apparently feared only the loss of a good trial lawyer's services. 268 However,
while courts and prosecutors may not be the appropriate parties to identify
those defendants deprived of fair advice about cooperation by their
attorneys,269 the likelihood that such a class does exist requires that we heed
the call of that defendant who finds his lawyer a hinderance to cooperation
negotiations.
What is needed is a scheme that ensures representation for a defendant in
his dealings with the government, but allows him, at least temporarily, to avoid
using an attorney who he believes will impede those discussions. 270 The
defendant with the means to do so can retain a separate lawyer to explore
cooperation and keep his other lawyer in the dark. Defendants without these
resources should not be cast adrift for lack of them. When contacted by a
defendant wishing to explore cooperation behind his lawyer's back, the
government thus should be permitted to arrange for a judicial officer to appoint
a new lawyer for the limited purpose of advising the defendant about
cooperation. The Justice Department's proposed regulations-promulgated to
"reconcile the purposes underlying [the 'no contact' disciplinary rules] with
effective law enforcement" 271-are thus salutory in setting out a procedure for
interpretations to permit defendant waiver "reflect sound attempts to reconcile the anti-
contact rule with substantive law"); Green, supra note 10, at 314 (arguing that courts
applying DR 7-104 should not limit themselves to "the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation"); John Leubsdorf, Conmunicating with Another Lawyer's Cient: The
Lawyer's Veto and the Cient's Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683 (1979) (urging
restructuring of DR 7-104 to give client more control over whether opposing counsel can
communicate with him directly).
268 United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 989 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
269 See supra text accompanying notes 236-44.
270 Given the Supreme Court's hostility to claims that a defendant's constitutional right
to self-representation, as recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), leaves
him free to assume responsibility for certain aspects of his defense but keep his lawyer for
other aspects, see McKaslde v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (no constitutional right
to "'hybrid' representation"); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 556, there is little force
to the argument, unsuccessfully urged by the government in Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1040-41,
that Fareta gives a defendant a "right" to talk to the government about cooperation behind
his lawyer's back.
271 Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. at 10,088 (Mar. 3, 1994)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77). DR 7-104(A)(1) allows an attorney to directly contact an
opposing party if he has been "authorized by law to do so." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983). The Justice Department's regulations are intended
to provide that authorization. Communications with Represented Persons, supra at 10,087-
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the appointment of "substitute counsel" in such situations. 272
More troubling is that part of the new Justice Department regulation which
authorizes prosecutors, in the alternative, to have "substantive" discussions
directly with a defendant who "waives" his right to representation. Upon such
a waiver, the regulations would allow prosecutors actually to negotiate a
cooperation agreement directly with the defendant.273 The defendant who fears
that his lawyer will not serve him well in cooperation discussions with the
government may thus commit himself to an agreement without ever having
heard fair advice about the government's track record with cooperators. This
unfortunate result may be justified by actual or perceived security concerns:
Perhaps the defendant who fears some harm if his lawyer learns of his
overtures to the government ought not to be forced to place his trust in some
outsider. Respect for the defendant's autonomy may itself argue against the
imposition of unwanted counsel. But the cost of allowing defendants the
freedom to forgo the only real guarantee of the government's good faith should
not be minimized.
At bottom, our chief concern must be not the decisions that a defendant
makes but his access to fair advice about his options. The defendant who
remains undeterred by his attorney's anticooperation stance, and all the other
disincentives to snitching, and endeavors on his own to explore the advantages
of cooperation has at least identified himself as one in need of additional advice
and judicial protection. We can try to design procedures to protect his interests.
But he is the extraordinary defendant. Other defendants, trapped within the
constraints of the adversary system, are unlikely to receive any such help and
may never even know that they need it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Should we pity the snitch? Do the misdeeds of those he "betrays" justify
the betrayal? Can one condemn the betrayal but applaud the prosecution it
facilitates? The answers to these questions, to me at least, are far from clear,
and quite beyond the scope of this Article. One need not approve of a
sentencing scheme awarding extraordinary leniency to snitches to believe that,
where such a scheme prevails, a defendant with information to trade ought to
be permitted to make his own decision about cooperation and should, for this
purpose, get advice from a lawyer loyal to his interests. Indeed, a world in
which defendants' decisions about cooperation are a function of their lawyers'
88. 272 Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. at 10,100 (1994) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77.6(c)ii)).
273 Id. at 10,100-01 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.6(c)(2)(i), 77.8).
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predilections is one where the snitch's windfall, already a challenge to a
sentencing scheme based on desert, becomes even more arbitrary.
We may be living in such a world. The principal source of agency costs in
cooperation negotiations doubtless is the failure (or inability) of a great many
attorneys-particularly those representing indigent defendants-to stake out and
pursue adversarial positions against the government. The literature about this
problem is forceful and clear, although little heeded by those with the power to
ameliorate the situation.274 But a pathology of the defense bar should also
recognize that a significant number of lawyers, although quite prepared to
negotiate ordinary plea bargains, have strong incentives to prevent clients from
cutting deals that include cooperation. A lawyer with a financial or other
relationship with the potential target of a client's cooperation is certainly likely
to deter such cooperation. This is the house counsel problem. What I have
suggested in this Article, however, is that even a lawyer without such specific
allegiances may find cooperation inimicable to the economic or ideological
interests that drive her practice, and may advise her clients accordingly.
To what degree are lawyers depriving defendants of the chance to make
their own decisions about cooperation? The evidence that is not anecdotal is
speculative. But the problem may not be susceptible to empirical inquiry
because both lawyers and clients are bound to be less than candid about these
matters. Whether, on the present record, we consider countermeasures 275 must
depend on where the burden of persuasion lies. And any proposal for reform
ought to face an uphill battle, because the same ideological and economic
motivations that can lead lawyers to deter clients from cooperating also power
those lawyers' adversarial efforts in a system where zeal is all too rare.
So the answer may be to do nothing, save in those exceptional cases where
there is clear evidence of the conflicts of interests discussed here. But one is
left with a nagging suspicion that many defendants, at the time when they are
most in need of legal advice, are prisoners of the adversary system that, for so
many other purposes, is their best protection.
274 See generally Klein, supra note 233.
275 One such countermeasure might bar the payment of a client's fees by an interested
third party. See Lowenthal, supra note 165, at 988-89 (proposing disciplinary rule
"explicitly" forbidding "representation of a criminal defendant when a person or entity who
may incur criminal liability as a result of the defendant's cooperation with the government
pays the lawyer's fee"). But this rule-to the extent that third parties did not circumvent it,
for example, by giving money directly to clients and then referring them to defense
attorneys-would deny many defendants access to the higher end of the defense bar, a
deprivation that might equally disserve defendant autonomy.
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